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EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: A LESSON IN
PROFESSIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY
The rapid decline of American schools' has met with growing
demands for educational accountability. 2 Since the late 1970s and
early 1980s, an increasing number of students have attempted to
recover damages for injuries that they allegedly 'suffered as the
result of receiving a negligent educations A majority of these plain-
tiffs have been either special needs students claiming that an edu-
cational institution failed to diagnose them properly or place them
in an appropriate program,4
 or students alleging that a school sys-
The McNeillLehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Dec. 13, 1990) (transcript on
LEXIS/NEXIS) (student performance in the nation's schools is continuing to decline prompt-
ing President Bush to call the nation's governors to an unprecedented education summit in
Virginia). See generally D. KEARNS & D. DOYLE, WINNING THE BRAIN RACE: A BOLD PLAN TO
MAKE OUR SCHOOLS COMPETITIVE (1988) (public education in the United States is in a crisis:
the public schools graduate 700,000 functionally illiterate students every year).
2 See Funston, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 743, 743-44 (1981); see also Valdes, Accountability by Contract: A Proposal to
Remedy the Harm of Substandard Schooling and Promote Equal Educational Opportunity, 58 FLA. B.
J. 280, 283-86 (1984).
3 See, e.g., Ross v. Creighton Univ.• 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (N.D. Ill. 1990); D.S.W.
v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 555-56 (Alaska 1981); Smith v.
Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 718
(Ct. App. 1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 817,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 856-57 (Ct. App. 1976); Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111  Idaho
450, 451, 725 P.2d 155, 156 (1986); Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 44 III. App. 3d
324, 324-25, 358 N.E.2d 67, 68 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd, 69 111. 2d 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977);
Rich v. Kentucky County Day School, 793 S.W.2d 832, 833-34 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990); B.M. v.
State, 200 Mont. 58, 59, 649 P.2d 425, 425-26 (1982); Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Mont-
gomery County, 47 Md. App. 709, 710, 425 A.2d 681, 682 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981), modified,
439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982); Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 124-25,
474 N.E.2d 223, 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15, 19 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985); Palandino
V. Adelphi Univ., 110 Misc. 2d 314, 314, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, 38 (App. Div. 1981), rev'd, 89
A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982); DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592, 593, 517
N.Y.S.2d 754, 755 (App. Div. 1987); Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 64 A.D.2d
369, 385, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 110 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 31-32,
407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418
N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979); Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting, No. 90AP-264, 90AP-430
(Ohio App. Dec. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file); Poe v. Hamilton, 56 Ohio App.
3d 137, 137, 565 N.E.2d 887, 888 (1990).
See, e.g., D.S.W., 628 P.2d at 554; Smith, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 941, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 718;
Rich, 793 S.W.2d at 834; B.M., 200 Mont. at 62, 649 P.2d at 425.
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tem graduated them despite their lack of minimum educational
skills. 5
Arguing that their claims resemble traditional negligence ac-
tions, plaintiffs have sought damages under the theory that a breach
of professional duty has occurred. 6 These plaintiffs claim that the
duty to educate competently arises frorri common-law or statutory
standards of care.? Moreover, students who have brought suit
against private institutions have asserted that a.contract for services
existed between the parties, and thus, courts should award damages
for the breach of the contractual duty to educate. 8
When first confronted with the tort-like educational malprac-
tice claims in the late 1970s, the New York and California courts
stated that an educational malpractice claim required plaintiffs to
show that the educator owed them a duty of care that was breached,
and that such breach proximately caused a measurable injury to the
plaintiff.9
 These courts maintained that recognition of an educa-
tional malpractice cause of action was dependent on whether edu-
cators had violated recognizable educational standards of conduct,
and thereby, breached a duty of care that they owed to their stu-
dents. 1 ° Finally, these courts concluded that even if a legal duty
existed theoretically, and a negligence claim was possible," they
should recognize educational malpractice only if public policy fa-
vored 4.' 2
These early courts identified four general categories of public
policy considerations that they would balance before they could
See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal, App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856; Hunter, 47 Md. App.
at 710, 425 A.2d at 681-82. See generally Note, Hunter v. Board of Education & Doe v. Board
of Education - No Cause of Action For Educational Malpractice Against Public School Teachers and
Psychologists, 42 Mo. L. REV. 582, 583-85 (1983) (general discussion of the two different types
of educational malpractice claims).
6 See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856; Donohue, 64 A.D.2d
at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877, aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at
375; Poe, 56 Ohio App. 3d at 137, 565 N.E.2d at 888.
7 See, e.g., D.S.W., 628 P.2d at 555-56; Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 817-27, 131 Cal.
Rptr, at 856-62; B.M., 200 Mont. at 59-62, 649 P.2d at 425-27.
8 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1323 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Rich, 793 S.W.2d
at 834; Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111 Idaho 450, 451, 725 P.2d 155, 157 (1986);
Village Community School v. Adler, 124 Misc. 2d 817, 818, 478 N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (Civ. Ct.
1984).
9 See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857; Donohue, 64 A.D.2d
at 32-33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
1 ° See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857; Donohue, 64 A.D.2d
at 32-33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
It See, e.g., Donahue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
" Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859; Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 444,
391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
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recognize educational malpractice claims.'s The first category of
public policy considerations was preventative considerations, which
included the difficulties inherent in establishing an educational stan-
dard of care against which to measure defendants' conduct, in
proving proximate cause, and in measuring injury." The second
category of public policy considerations was moral considerations,
which included the appropriateness of judicial review of school
activity, education's social utility, and the student-teacher relation-
ship. 15
 The final two categories of public policy considerations were
economic and administrative concerns, which encompassed the pos-
sibility of a flood of new claims, and the litigations' fiscal impact on
the community. 1 °
Subsequent courts that have decided educational malpractice
claims have applied public policy analyses to claims against both
private and public educators, and to claims of misfeasance as well
as claims of nonfeasance." Although no one court has discussed all
of the issues, each has focused on one or more of the preventative,
moral, administrative, or economic public policy considerations. Be-
cause recognition of educational malpractice is a state issue"' that a
majority of courts have not yet confronted, each argument is per-
suasive authority.
Courts that have refused to recognize educational malpractice
causes of action have concluded that a duty of care for educators
does not exist.' 9 They have reasoned that neither the conduct of
other educators nor statutory provisions establish a standard of care
against which courts can measure educators' conduct. 2° Thus, they
have asserted that absent a professional standard of care, there can
be no breach of duty, and thus, no negligence liability. 2 ' in addition,
" See, e.g., Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877; see also Peter W., 60 Cal. App.
3d at 822, 13) Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
14 Donahue, 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
18 Id.
18
 See Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859; Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 33,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
17 See infra notes 99-101.
18
 Bishop v. Indiana Technical Vocational College, 742 F. Supp. 524, 525 (W.D. Wis.
1990) (court considered a student's claim that she received an inferior educational experience
from the defendant in violation of the United States Constitution and held that educational
malpractice is a matter of state law).
19
 See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55; see also Hunter
v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 47 Md. App. 709, 716, 425 A.2d 681, 685 (Ct.
Spec. App. 1981), modified, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
2° See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
21
 See, e,g., Id. at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55; see also Hunter, 47 Md. App. at 716,
425 A.2d at 685.
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these courts have reasoned that one cannot prove causation and
injury,22
 and that educational malpractice necessitates unwarranted
judicial oversight of professional educators' activities." Finally, these
courts have maintained that, if recognized, educational claims would
threaten schools with an untold fiscal burden. 24
Conversely, those majority and minority opinions that have
favored the recognition of liability for schools and their agents have
focused on other similar professional malpractice claims that the
courts recognize. 25 Some of these courts and justices have cited the
availability of a standard of care for professional educators in the
form of accepted pedagogic methods, statutory provisions, or con-
tract terms. 26
 Thus, these courts have concluded that educational
malpractice actions present the same problems of proof of standard
of care, proximate cause, and injury as other professional negli-
gence claims, and thus, should be recognized. 27 Finally, some opin-
ions have focused on the serious impact that negligent education
has on children and society as a reason for favoring recognition of
these claims. 28
This note examines in detail the public policy elements that
have affected courts' recognition of an educational malpractice
cause of action." Section I briefly discusses the legal theories and
methods of proof underlying professional malpractice in general. 3°
22 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 37, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 880 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1979); see also Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
23 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 125-27, 400 N.E.2d
317, 320-21, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378-79; see also Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs., 64
N.Y.2d 119, 126, 474 N.E.2d 223, 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15, 18 (1984).
24 See, e.g., Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979) (claim against a public agency and school); Moore
v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114-15 (Iowa 1986) (doctor's educational malpractice within
a medical malpractice claim); Rich v. Kentucky County Day School, 793 S.W.2d 832, 836
(Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (claim against a private school).
23 See Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
26 See, e.g., Id. (professional conduct); B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 63, 649 P.2d 425,
427 (1982) (statutory duty of care); County of Riverside v. Loma Linda Univ., 118 Cal. App.
3d 300, 319 n.7, 173 Cal. Rptr. 371, 379-80 n.7 (Ct. App. 1981) (contract terms).
27 See Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28 See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979); see also Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
29 Unlike earlier commentary, this note does not differentiate between special education
and standard education claims, or between private and public defendants, but rather presents
a general discussion of the overarching policy considerations that courts have considered
when deciding whether to recognize educational malpractice claims.
S0 See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying text.
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This section then discusses the seminal cases in educational mal-
practice that identified the relevant public policy considerations on
which subsequent courts addressing educational malpractice have
relied.3 ' Section II explores the preventative, moral, administrative,
and economic considerations of public policy that courts use in their
analyses of educational negligence. 32 Section III discusses cases hav-
ing parallel fact patterns to some educational malpractice claims,
but which courts and plaintiffs have brought under a medical mal-
practice label." Section 1V evaluates the legitimacy of the courts'
analyses of the public policy considerations that have slowed the
recognition of educational malpractice claims, and concludes that
these analyses are incomplete, inconsistent, and discriminatory. 34
Consequently, Section IV suggests that courts should revise their
reasoning regarding these claims to reflect current reality, and thus,
recognize educational malpractice.
11. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE IN EDUCATION: AN HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT
A. The Foundation: Professional Malpractice Actions Generally
If a person has knowledge, skill or even intelligence superior
to that of an ordinary person, the law demands that his or her
conduct be consistent with it." Consequently, professionals are held
to a higher standard of conduct than the ordinary person, and are
required to possess a standard minimum level of special knowledge
and ability. 30 The law has recognized professional malpractice ac-
tions when a professional demonstrates misconduct or an unrea-
sonable lack of skill. 37
 A malpractice claim requires that the profes-
sional owe the plaintiff a legal duty of care, that the professional
breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate cause of
injury to the plaintiff. 38
 Although most of the decided cases of
31 See infra notes 47-102 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 103-318 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 319-440 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 341-448 and accompanying text.
'5 `,y 	PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 32 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
PROSSER & KEETON],
id.
" Malpractice is defined as professional misconduct, unreasonable lack of skill or fidelity
in professional or fiduciary duties, evil practice, or illegal or immoral conduct which results
in a loss or damage to the recipient of professional services or those entitled to rely upon
them. likames LAW DICTIONARY 864 (5th ed. 1979).
" PROSSER Sc KF.EToN, supra note 35, at 164.
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professional malpractice have dealt with medical personnel, courts
have applied the theory to other professionals including lawyers,
architects, engineers," and clergy. 40
For example, physicians who hold themselves out as having
professional knowledge and skill invite public reliance.'" Thus, the
law requires that physicians demonstrate the minimum level of skill
and knowledge that is usual and customary in their speciality areas. 42
If a physician fails to demonstrate such skill or accepted conduct,
and injures a person, an action for malpractice may arise."
If the physician might have followed differing schools of med-
ical thought and alternative methods of acceptable treatment, a
court will look for a standard of care in the tenants of the meth-
odology that the physician professed to follow." To serve as a
standard of care, a medical school of thought must have definite
principles, and a respectable minority of the profession must follow
it.* When lay jurors are unable to evaluate complex medical tech-
nique questions, the parties involved in a malpractice claim may
introduce expert testimony to prove negligence or wrongful con-
duct."
In sum, those individuals who hold themselves out to the public
as having skill or knowledge beyond that of an ordinary person are
professionals. As professionals, they are held to a higher standard
of care in their activities than the ordinary person. Consequently,
if they commit acts that a trier of fact could characterize as negligent
or in conflict with common practice, courts can find them liable for
malpractice.
B. Educational Malpractice: The Early Cases Setting Out the Framework
for Review
In response to a growing dissatisfaction with the performance
of American public schools, the public has called for accountability
3' Id. at 185-86.
4° Russ, Minister Liable For 'Clergy Malpractice', 9 LAWYER'S ALERT 1 ( June 11, 1990)
(woman alleged that a minister sexually abused her while she was receiving spiritual coun-
seling from him and was awarded damages for professional negligence and negligent infl-
iction of emotional distress).
41 See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, at 187.
3
 See, e.g., Rich v. Kentucky County Day School, 793 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Ky. Ct. App.
1990).
4' See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, at 185 n.22.
44 See id. at 187.
" Id.
46 Id. at 188.
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in education. 47 Commentators note that the heightened awareness
of educational standards has resulted in students initiating lawsuits
against their schools for educational malpractice." A majority of
these plaintiffs have based their claims on the legal theory of profes-
sional malpractice. 4° These plaintiffs have argued that because
courts have found malpractice in other professions to be legally
compensable, courts should also apply malpractice standards to the
education profession. 5° That is, these plaintiffs have argued that
educators have a minimum legal obligation to effect academic in-
struction so 'as to impart competence in basic subjects, just as doctors
have a minimum obligation to perform medical procedures corn-
petently. 5
In 1976, the California Court of Appeal, in Peter W. v. San
Francisco Unified School District, was the first court to consider the
application of the professional malpractice theory to educators. 52
The Peter W. court held that no cause of action for a student against'
his school district existed. 53 The plaintiff in Peter W., a graduate of
the defendant's elementary and secondary schools, had alleged that
the defendant and its employees had negligently failed to provide
him with adequate instruction, guidance, counseling, and supervi-
sion in basic academic skills, such as reading and writing." The
Peter W. court reasoned that public policy dictated that educators
do not owe a duty of care to their students, and consequently,
established that an educational malpractice action for breach of the
duty to educate did not exist. 55
47 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Note, Educational Malpractice: D.S.W.
v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District (Alaska 1981), 11 UCLA ALASKA L. REV.
111,  I 11-18 (1981) (discussion of dissatisfaction with schools); Note, Education and the Law:
Functional Literacy Program—A Matter of Timing, 10 STETSON L. Ray, 125, 125-39 (1980)
(discussion of Florida's accountability legislation and related case law involving functional
literacy).
48 Note, Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Need of a Call for Action, 22 VAL. U.
L. REV. 427, 429 (1988). See generally Loscalz.o, Liability for Malpractice in Education, 14 J.L. &
Enuc. 595 (1985) (defining the term "educational malpractice").
48 See; e.g., cases cited supra note 6, See generally Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the
Educational Harms Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 Nw. U.L. REV. 641, 713-45
(1978) (discussion of teaching as a skilled trade).
5° Funston, supra note 2, at 746, See generally Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine
to the Teaching Profession, 11 J.L. & Enuc, 479-505 (1982) (discussion of physical injury claims
of malpractice versus educational negligence claims).
u See Funston, supra note 2, at 746-47.
58 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 817, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 855 (Ct. App. 1976).
53 Id.
" Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
55 See id, at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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The plaintiff in Peter W. alleged that because the defendant
had failed to identify his reading disabilities, it had placed him in
classes in which he could not read the assigned materials, and where
instructors who were not geared to his reading level taught him."
Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged that his teachers promoted him
from one grade level to the next even though they knew, or should
have known, that he lacked the skills requisite for such advance-
ment. Thus, the student in Peter W. claimed that the school had
breached the duty of care that it owed to him. He claimed that a
duty of care arose from the defendant's assumption of the function
of instructing students, or the special relationship between students
and their teachers. 57
Alternatively, the plaintiff alleged that the school had breached
a mandatory duty under the California education code requiring
parental notification of a student's progress." Moreover, the plain-
tiff asserted that he was unable to read beyond the eighth grade
level as a result of the defendant's failure to exercise the profes-
sional skill of an ordinary and prudent educator. This reading
disability, the plaintiff claimed, prevented him from gaining mean-
ingful employment, and he sought to recover damages for perma-
nent disabilities, as well as special damages incurred for compen-
satory tutoring. 59 The Peter W. court concluded that the plaintiff's
first count pled negligence, and it considered whether the elements
of a tort claim existed. 6° Because the parties did not debate the
adequacy of the student's claim with respect to negligence, proxi-
mate cause, and injury, the court focused on the existence of a
legally recognizable duty of care. The court reasoned that public
policy considerations would determine judicial recognition of a spe-
cial duty of care for educators. 6 '
The Peter W. court identified the relevant public policy concerns
that it had to balance in deciding whether to recognize a legal duty
of care and a new tort claim for education malpractice. 62 Among
these considerations were education's social utility, compared with
the risks involved in its conduct, and the powers and limitations
imposed on public schools. The court also stated that its ability to
86 Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
Id, at 820-21, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
58 Id. at 826, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
59 Id. at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
60 Id. at 819-20, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
61 See id. at 820, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 857.
82 Id.
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discern a workable rule of care for educators and to prove causation
and injury affected its decision. In addition, it noted that it should
consider the parties' relative ability to bear the financial burden of
the injury and the available means for shifting or spreading the
loss. Finally, the Peter W. court listed administrative considerations
of feigned claims and the prospect of limitless liability as public
policy concerns.° These enumerated public policy considerations,
the Peter W. court reasoned, would determine whether the student's
interests were entitled to legal protection."
In order to recognize a new area of tort liability, the Peter W.
court maintained that the defendant's wrongful conduct and the
resulting injury had to be recognizable and measurable within the
existing legal framework. 65 Thereafter, the court reasoned that ed-
ucational malfeasance and injury, unlike other negligence claims,
did not afford a readily acceptable standard of care, cause or in-
jury.66 Pedagogy, the court concluded, was unique because it encom-
passed conflicting theories of conduct.° Furthermore, the court
reasoned that because numerous subjective factors influenced a
child's academic achievement, causation could not be shown with
any certainty." The court also reasoned that a child's inability to
read and write was not injury within the meaning of negligence
law.° In addition, the Peter W. court maintained that recognition of
a legal duty of care and resulting liability would expose educational
institutions to countless real or feigned claims, which would burden
them and society with incalculable costs in public time and money. 7°
Considering the public schools' role and their limited budgets, the
Peter W. court concluded that public policy considerations negated
an actionable duty of care for educators."
6 3 Id. at 823, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
64 See id. at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
" Id, at 823 & n.3, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860 & n.3.
60 Id.
67 See id. at 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
" Id, at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 860-61.
fig Id. at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
70 Id. at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
See id. In addition, the Peter W. court considered the claimant's allegations that the
school had falsely and fraudulently represented to his mother that he was performing at
grade level. Id. at 827, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63. Based on the public policy reasons already
stated, the court reasoned that no cause of action existed for negligence in the form of
misrepresentation, intentional or otherwise. Id. Absent reliance upon the misrepresentation,
the Peter W. court held that there was no cause of action for educational misrepresentation.
Id.
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In considering the plaintiff's alternative claim that the school
had breached a mandatory duty that the California education code
imposed, the Peter W. court also held that the plaintiff had no cause
of action. The court reasoned it could recognize liability for such a
statutory violation only where a legislative enactment was designed
to protect against the type of injury that the plaintiff claimed.
Concluding that the state education code was designed to achieve
optimal educational results, not to safeguard against injury, the Peter
W. court concluded that the school had no liability resulting from
its violation." Thus, the Peter W. court established that for public
policy reasons, no common-law or statutory duty of care for edu-
cators existed, and consequently, that no cause of action in educa-
tional malpractice exists in California.
Three years after the California Court of Appeal decided Peter
W., the New York courts had an opportunity to decide the issue. In
1979, the New York Court of Appeals, in Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School District, considered a former student's claim against a
school district alleging common-law educational malpractice or
breach of a constitutionally imposed duty to educate." Reasoning
that the public policy concern over judicial interference in state
educational policy-making was dispositive of the issue, the Donohue
court established that New York would not recognize a cause of
action for educational negligence. 74
In Donohue, the plaintiff alleged that his former school had
breached the duty of care that it owed him when it had failed to
evaluate his mental ability and capacity to comprehend subjects. 75
The student further alleged that the school failed to hire proper
personnel and adopt accepted professional standards and methods
to evaluate and cope with his difficulties.76
 Furthermore, he claimed
that the school had graduated him, despite his failing grades and
inability to master basic reading and writing skills, in violation of
the New York State constitution provision requiring the legislature
to provide schools for all children. 77 Thus, the plaintiff sought
compensatory damages for alleged deficiencies in his knowledge.
72
 Id. at 826-27, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
73
 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 442, 391 N.E.2d 1352,
1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 376-77 (1979), aff 'g 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div.
1978).
74 Id. at 443-44, 391 N.E.2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
75 Id.
76 Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
77 Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 442, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
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The trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not sustain an
action alleging negligence absent a showing that the defendant owed
the plaintiff a duty of care that it breached and that proximately
resulted in injury." The court focused on the existence of a duty
of care in the defendant and a corresponding right in the plaintiff.
Reasoning that judicial recognition of a duty of care depended upon
public policy principles, the Donohue court identified the relevant
considerations.
The first category of public policy principles that the court
identified was comprised of preventative considerations, including
the school's ability to adopt a practical means of preventing injury,
the certainty of causation, and the foreseeability of harm to the
students. 79 The second category was comprised of moral consider-
ations that arose from society's view towards the parties' relation-
ship, the degree to which the courts should be involved in the
regulation of education, and education's social utility. The final
categories of public policy considerations were economic, including
the defendant's ability to pay damages, and administrative, includ-
ing the court's ability to cope with a possible flood of litigation and
the probability of feigned claims.
Citing Peter W., the Donohue court concluded that educators'
conduct and alleged educational injuries were not comprehensible
or measurable within the existing judicial framework. 89 The court
adopted the rationale of Peter W. and concluded that there was no
workable rule of care, certainty of causation, or measurable injury. 8 '
Reasoning further that every child is born without knowledge and
education, the Donohue court asserted that it could not characterize
the lack of educational achievement as a tort injury. 82
In addition, the Donohue court maintained that courts were an
inappropriate forum in which to test the efficacy of pedagogic
methods. It reasoned that it was not the court's role to evaluate
conflicting educational theories or to determine how to utilize scarce
educational resources. 88 As a result, the Donohue court concluded
that educational policy-making was the exclusive jurisdiction of state
officials and was not subject to judicial oversight. It held that no
78 Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 32-33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
79 See id. at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
8° Id. at 34-35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
81 Id. at 37, 39, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880-81.
B2 Id.
BB Id. at 35-36, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
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legal duty of care flowing from educators to their students existed,
and therefore, that no claim for educational malpractice existed. 84
In response to the plaintiff's claims that the school had
breached a mandatory constitutional duty to educate, the Donohue
court also concluded that no liability existed. The court reasoned
that the constitutional provisions that the plaintiff had cited were
not intended to protect against ignorance. 85 The court noted that
statutes that were not intended to protect against injury, but rather
to confer a benefit upon the public, did not give rise to individual
causes of action for their breach." Stating that alternative admin-
istrative remedies for relief existed, the Donohue court concluded
that no cause of action for negligent education could be brought
under the New York constitution.
In dissent, Judge Suozzi criticized the majority's conclusion,
and argued that the plaintiff's complaint had stated a valid cause
of action." Judge Suozzi argued that the public policy considera-
tions that the majority cited did not mandate a dismissal of the
complaint.88 Reasoning that educational malpractice claims were no
different than other forms of negligence, he argued that proof of
causation and injury were questions to be resolved at trial. Judge
Suozzi also asserted that if the school had failed to adopt accepted
testing, diagnostic, and remedial procedures, it should be subjected
to a malpractice action. 89 He further reasoned that New York's
abolition of sovereign immunity refuted the court's fear of a flood
of litigation, which in any event, was insufficient reason to differ-
entiate between educational malpractice and other forms of negli-
gence." As an example, he noted that the courts have accepted
environmental claims that often involved complex issues of proof
and resulted in multiple lawsuits.9 '
Alternatively, Judge Suozzi argued that in graduating the plain-
tiff in Donohue, the school had seemingly breached a mandatory
statutory duty. 92 He pointed to New York educational regulations
that required that all state diploma recipients satisfactorily complete
84 See id. at 31, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
85 Id. at 37, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
" Id. at 37-38, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
87 See id. at 39, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 882 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
813 Id. at 41, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 44, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 884-85 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
" See id. at 41-42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
94 See id. at 44, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
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a four year course of study, and that all school boards evaluate their
pupils." The plaintiff's failing grades, he concluded, were evidence
that the school had violated stated educational standards. 94 Thus,
Judge Suozzi argued that the plaintiff in Donohue had stated a
negligence cause of action by describing the school's violation of
professional and statutory standards of conduct.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the lower Donohue
court's holding and refused to recognize a cause of action for either
educational malpractice, or breach of a constitutionally imposed
duty to educate. 95 The Donohue court reasoned that although it
could imagine a theoretical claim for educational malpractice, as a
matter of public policy, it could not recognize the action." Conse-
quently, the Donohue court established that public policy consider-
ations dictated dismissal of educational malpractice actions in New
York.97
Courts confronted with subsequent claims of educational neg-
ligence have adopted the public policy balancing test of the Peter
W. and Donohue courts in the context of a variety of fact patterns."
Preventative, moral, economic, and administrative public policy con-
siderations have affected the outcome of educational malpractice
claims whether the defendant's actions were misfeasance or non-
feasance," or the defendant was a private or public school,'" or
other agency.'°' Thus, concern over the difficulty of proving a
" Id. at 43-44, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 884 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
94 See id.'at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
"' Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
96 Id. at 444, 391 N.E.2c1 at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
97 Id. at 444-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1354-55, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78. See generally Note,
Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District: New York Chooses Not to Recognize "Educa-
tional Malpractice," 43 ALB. L. REV. 339, 339-59 (1979).
es
	 e.g., Torres v. Little Flower Children's Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 126, 474 N.E.2d
223, 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d, 15, 18 (1984) (defendant was public guardian), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
864 (1985); Hoffman v. Board of Educ., 49 N.Y.2d 121, 126, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424
N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979); Helm v. Professional Children's School, 103 Misc. 2d 1053, 1053-
54, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246, 246-47 (App. Div. 1980) (private school).
" See, e.g., Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378. See
infra notes 264-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hoffman decision. "Mis-
feasance" is the improper performance of some act which a person may lawfully do and
"nonfeasance" is the omission of an act which a person ought to do. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1000 (5th ed. 1979).
mo E.g., Palandino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 89-90, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 871-72
(App. Div. 1981). See infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Palandino decision.
101
 Torres, 64 N.Y.2d at 123, 474 N.E.2d at 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 18. Sec infra notes 184-
92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Torres decision.
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standard of care, causation, and injury has influenced some court
decisions.
Other courts, like those in Peter W. and Donohue, have expressed
concern over judicial interference, and the possible fiscal impact of
new tort liability.'°2 Although no one court has focused on all of
these issues, each court had discussed one or more of the public
policy concerns. The following section will lay out the reasoning
courts have adopted in considering whether to recognize an action
in educational malpractice within the framework of the four Dono-
hue categories.
II. CONSIDERING AND BALANCING THE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC POLICY
In Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School District, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, identified four public policy
categories affecting recognition of an educational malpractice
claim.m The Donohue court stated that courts had to balance prev-
entative, moral, economic, and administrative considerations before
they could recognize a duty of care flowing from educators to their
students. Subsequent courts that have confronted educational neg-
ligence claims have focused on one or more of these identified
considerations.
A. Preventative Considerations: Demonstrating a Standard of Care,
Proximate Cause and Injury
In Donohue, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
identified a number of preventative considerations affecting the
recognition of a duty of care, and thus, an educational malpractice
cause of action.m4 These considerations included: whether a prac-
tical, proper course existed to prevent injury that the defendant
could adopt (existence of a workable standard of care); concerns
over the difficulty of showing proximate cause; and the foreseea-
bility of the plaintiff's injury. 105 Courts that have focused their
discussions of recognition of educational negligence claims on prev-
entative considerations of public policy have fallen into one or more
of these three subcategories.
102 See infra notes 260-91, 303-18 and accompanying text.
'" 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
i" Id.
m5 Id.
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1. Existence of a Workable Standard of Care
The first element of preventative public policy concerns is the
judicial system's ability to identify a workable standard of care
against which to measure an educator's conduct." Plaintiffs alleg-
ing educational malpractice in public schools have attempted to
demonstrate that either the conduct of other educators i° 7 or the
provisions of state legislation" define an educational standard of
care. Alternatively, claimants against private educational institutions
have alleged that contractual terms defined the standard of care."
a. Common Law Standard of Care
Plaintiffs alleging educational malpractice have sought to prove
that teachers, like other professionals, should be held to a higher
professional standard of care than ordinary persons in their con-
duct."° Plaintiffs have asked courts to look to the conduct of other
ISO Id. at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877; see also l'eter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist.,
60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976).
107 Set, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856 (plaintiff alleged that
defendant failed to exercise skill of ordinary prudent educator); Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 32,
407 N.Y.S.2d at 877 (plaintiff alleged that defendant failed to adopt the accepted professional
standards and methods). See generally Funston, supra note 2, at 779-84.
'" See, e.g., Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 187 Cal. App. 3d 639, 640, 232
Cal. Rptr, 61, 62 (Ct. App. 1986) (student cited California constitution and accompanying
education code in his action against school district alleging violation of the suspension and
expulsion provisions); Rubio v. Carlsbad Mun. School Dist., 106 N.M. 446, 448-49, 744 P.2d
919, 921 (1987) (students cited New Mexico constitution and accompanying legislation in
their action against school district alleging failure to obtain an adequate education from a
drug using teacher); Agostine v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 527 A.2d 193, 195-96 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1987) (learning disabled student cited public school code in her action alleging
the school district improperly placed her in a class for the mentally retarded); Lindsay v.
Thomas, 465 A.2d 122, 123-24 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (learning disabled student cited
public school code in his action against school district alleging failure to identify special needs
student and to educate); Camer v. Seattle School Dist. No.1, 52 Wash. App. 531, 536, 762
P.2d 356, 359 (Ct. App. 1988) (student cited Washington Basic Education Act in action
against school district alleging failure to teach state constitution and provide optimum learn-
ing atmosphere).
109 See cases cited supra note 8; see also Swidryx v. St. Michael's Medical Center, 201 N.J.
Super. 601, 603, 493 A.2d 641, 642 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (physician involved in
medical malpractice claim brought action against former medical school alleging that school
failed to provide him with a suitable environment for a medical educational experience);
Palandino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 86, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1982)
(parents sued private elementary school seeking damages sustained as a result of alleged
breach of contract to provide a quality education to their child); Malone v. Academy of Court
Reporting, No. 90AP-264, 90AP-430 (Ohio App. Dec. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, States library,
Omni file) (students sued paralegal institute for fraud and breach of contract).
"o See, e.g., Peter W, 60 Cal. App. 3d at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856; Donohue, 64 A.D.2d
at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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professional educators to define a common-law standard of care.
Where teachers have violated accepted pedagogic practices, these
plaintiffs have contended that a duty of care has been breached,
and that consequently, courts should find liability. In response to
these allegations, courts have focused their debate over the existence
of an educational standard of care on the extent to which education
is similar to other professions currently subjected to malpractice
claims.'''
Those courts that have refused to find a standard and duty of
care for educators have reasoned that education is unlike other
professions in that it involves the interaction of many economic,
social, and philosophical factors." 2 Because the science of pedagogy
is abstract and complex, these courts have reasoned that a profes-
sional standard of care cannot be applied to educators. For example,
in 1989, the United States District Court, for the Northern District
of California, in Swany v. San Ramon Valley Unified School District,
considered a student's civil rights, breach of contract, and negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims against his school for unrea-
sonably withholding his diploma, and held that no cause of action
existed." 3 Citing Peter W., the Swany court reasoned that California
law required only that teachers act as would reasonably prudent
persons in like circumstances, and thus, the court stated that Cali-
fornia law did not recognize a higher professional standard of
conduct for educators." 4 Where a school had not breached the
reasonable person standard, the Swany court established that no
claim of negligence could be allowed." 5
As suggested by the Swany court, one commentator argues that
application of a higher professional standard to teachers is inher-
ently inappropriate." 6 He asserts that unlike lawyers and' medical
personnel, teachers possess no well-defined technical knowledge,
and thus, there is reason to doubt their professionalism." 7 Fur-
thermore, he asserts that the only people who perceive educators
as professionals are educators, and consequently, pedagogic meth-
1 " See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55.
112 See, e.g., id. at 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 854-55; see also Hunter v. Board of Educ.
of Montgomery County, 47 Md. App. 709, 716, 425 A.2d 681, 685 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981),
modified, 439 A.2d 582 (1982).
112 720 F. Supp. 764, 781-82 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
114 Id. at 780.
116 See id. at 781.
"6 See Funston, supra note 2, at 779.
"7 Id. at 774.
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ods do not lend themselves to standardization. Because educators
have no minimum level of technical skill, and standardization of
the educational process is impossible, he concludes that a profes-
sional standard of care for educators cannot be established." 8
In determining whether a common-law professional standard
of care for educators exists, courts have focused not only on the
unique qualities of the educational profession, but also on the per-
ceived inability of triers of fact to address such qualities." 9 In other
words, courts have reasoned that education's collaborative process
is radically different from other professions, and therefore, that
education is simply too difficult for jurors to understand. Because
they have concluded that the proof or disproof of educational neg-
ligence is so difficult, these courts have refused to allow a cause of
action for educational malpractice.' 2°
For example, in Donohue, the New York Supreme Court, in
considering a claim that a school district had not adopted accepted
professional standards, reasoned that triers of fact would not be
able to decide which educational policies the school should have
pursued and which it should have avoided.'" Citing Peter W., the
Donohue court reasoned that the creation of an educational standard
of care would require courts and juries to evaluate educators' socio-
logical, psychological and educational assumptions. 122 Concluding
that such judicial review was unacceptable, the Donohue court held
that the school did not owe a duty of care to its students.' 23
A year later, in 1979, the California Court of Appeal, in Smith
v. Alameda County Social Services Agency, reinforced the notion that
triers of fact are too unsophisticated to be entrusted with the crea-
tion of a standard of care in educational claims that involve the
review of a defendant's subjective decision-making.'" In Smith, the
plaintiff alleged that a social services agency had negligently failed
"" See id.
"" See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 35, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 879 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1979). See generally Funston, supra note 2, at 779 (discussion of complexities inherent in
establishing a community standard for educators); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Courts, 51 TEX. L. REV. 411, 429-34 (1973) (courts' lack of knowledge about the factors
affecting education would no longer be a valid reason For judicial noninterference if the
right empirical advances were made).
ISO
 See, e,g., Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879.
III Id.
122 Id. at 35-36, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80.
122 Id. at 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
"4
 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 936-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 715-16 (Ct. App. 1979).
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to take reasonable action to bring about his adoption, and that a
school district had negligently placed him in classes for the mentally
retarded when he was not retarded.'" The plaintiff in Smith as-
serted that he was the expressed beneficiary of an agreement be-
tween his mother and the agency that promised that it would take
reasonable efforts to have him educated and adopted) 26
The Smith court reasoned that an educational - COiii.ract claim
raised the same insurmountable problems of causation and . iiijury
as a tort claim, and that no clear or manageable standard existed
for assessing the wrongfulness of the agency's or the educator's
conduct.' 27 Citing Peter W., the Smith court further reasoned that
requiring a trier of fact to exercise hindsight over years of social
work, involving difficult and partially subjective deCisions, would
result in a highly speculative inquiry.'" Consequently, the Smith
court held that the agency and school district did not owe the
student a duty of care, and thus, that no liability existed. 129
One commentator suggests that courts are acutely aware of
their own lack of expertise in the complex emotional issues that
educational malpractice claims raise.' 30 He asserts that this per-
ceived incompetence factors into their conclusion that no educa-
tional standard of care is legally recognizable.'" Courts believe, he
concludes, that career teachers and school administrators are more
qualified than courts to formulate educational policy.' 32
Although some courts have justified nonrecognition of educa-
tional negligence claims because of the difficulties inherent in es-
tablishing a standard of care for educators, other courts have sug-
gested that defining such a standard is not impossible. For example,
the New York Court of Appeals, in Donohue, stated in dicta that it
could imagine a legal duty of care flowing from professional edu-
cators to their students)"
In Id. at 933-34, 941, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
126 Id. at 942, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 719.
127 Id. at 936-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
128 Id. at 936-37, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 715-16.
128 Id. at 941-42, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 718-19.
188 Funston, supra note 2, at 793.
181 See Id. at 793 n.234.
132 See id. at 798.
'" Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979); see also Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York,
64 A.D.2d 369, 385, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 110 (App. Div. 1978) (stating that educational negli-
gence that is like medical negligence can be proven at trial), rend, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d
317, 424 N.Y.S. 2d 376 (1979).
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Moreover, some arguments in dissent have asserted that plain-
tiffs could prove an educational standard of care at trial in the same
manner as other professional standards of conduct."4 For instance,
in 1982, the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Hunter v. Board of
Education of Montgomery County, held that a student had no cause of
action in his educational malpractice claim alleging that his school
had failed to teach him properly. 155 The plaintiff in Hunter alleged
that the school had negligently evaluated his learning abilities, and
thus, had caused him to repeat the first grade while physically
placing him in the second grade. The Hunter court reasoned that it
could not establish causation or measure educational injury. 196 It
further reasoned that recognition of the cause of action would
improperly position the courts as overseers of the state educational
process. Thus, because it concluded that more appropriate admin-
istrative remedies for educational disputes were available, the
Hunter court ruled against any civil remedy for educational negli-
gence.'"
In dissent, however, Judge Davidson further developed the
Donohue sentiment that one could establish a standard of care in
educational tort claims."8 Judge Davidson argued that courts have
consistently recognized non-educational professional malpractice
claims that involved a variety of uncertainties. Moreover, Judge
Davidson argued that public educators, like lawyers and medical
personnel, are specially trained certified professionals who hold
themselves out as possessing certain skills and knowledge that non-
professionals do not share.'"
Judge Davidson maintained that education is no different from
medicine or law in that each profession encompasses differing the-
ories of conduct, and requires professional judgment. 14° Thus, he
argued, courts should judge educators according to the particular
methodology of their profession in the same manner that courts
judge physicians and lawyers. Finally, Judge Davidson concluded
that educators, as professionals, owe a professional duty of care to
' 54 See Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582,589 (Md. 1982)
(Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Note, supra note 5, at
582-95.




 Id. at 586.
158 See id. at 589 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I" Id. at 588-89 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
140 Id. (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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their students, and that a standard of care based upon customary
conduct was appropriate.m
This standard of care suggested by Judge Davidson, one com-
mentator argues, is possible to establish in light of currently avail-
able empirical evidence on pedagogical methods.' 42 Studies of test-
ing formats and instructional methodology, he asserts, can supply
courts with the evidence necessary to establish and define educa-
tional schools of conduct.' 43 Once defined, he concludes, courts
could use these schools of thought to evaluate an educator's conduct
in an educational malpractice action.'"
In sum, the debate over whether a common-law duty and stan-
dard of care for educators exists has led courts to examine the
professional nature of educators and their pedagogical methods.
Courts have understood the ease or difficulty of defining a legal
standard for educational malpractice claims as a function of their
ability to understand and evaluate the teaching vocation. Those
courts that have viewed teaching as a unique process unlike other
professions have held that no workable common-law standard of
care exists. Those majority and minority opinions that have .per-
ceived educators as similar to other professionals have concluded
that plaintiffs can prove a standard of care at trial.
b. Statutorily Defined Standard of Care
As an alternative to a common-law professional standard of
conduct, plaintiffs have argued that courts can find a duty and
standard of care for educators in state constitutional or legislative
language.' 45 Generally, courts have held that a plaintiff can plead a
tort claim for statutory violation, if he or she is a member of the
class of persons that the statute was designed to protect, and if the
injury suffered was the type that the statute was designed to pre-
14 ' Id.; see also Myers v. Medford Lakes Bd. of Educ., 199 N.J. Super. 511, 515-16, 989
A.2d 1240, 1242 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (stating in dicta that if courts recognized
educational malpractice in New Jersey, the relevant standard of care would be that conduct
prevailing among professional educators).
142 See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills,
63 TEX. L. REV. 777, 800-09 (1985) (argues that unsuccessful schools that fail to teach
students basic skills should be required to adopt more effective alternative methods of
instruction).
143 See id. at 803-04.
1 ' 4 See id. at 851-60.
145 See cases cited supra note 108.
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vent.' 4 " Consequently, courts deciding educational negligence claims
based on a statutory violation have reviewed the legislative history
of education legislation to determine if it provides for a tort cause
of action.' 47
After reviewing the legislative history, some courts and justices
have concluded that state education legislation can define a standard
and duty of care for educators in the context of educational mal-
practice actions. For example, in 1982, the Montana Supreme
Court, in B.M. v. State, considered a claim alleging misplacement of
,a child in a special education program, and refused to grant sum-
mary judgment in favor of the defendant school." 8
 Reasoning that
the school owed a duty of care to test and place the child properly,
the B.M. court held that the school could be held liable if it had
breached that duty. 149
In B.M., an outside psychologist had tested the plaintiff while
the child was in kindergarten, upon the recommendation of the
superintendent of schools.' 50
 The psychologist recommended that
the child repeat kindergarten or receive special educational help.
After deciding to seek state funds for a special education program
for the plaintiff and other first graders, the school submitted an
application and plan to the superintendent outlining the children's
needs.' 5 ' Subsequently, the school implemented an approved pro-
gram for the team teaching of integrated classes. The plaintiffs
alleged, however, that after five weeks the program had been
changed and the children had been segregated to a separate room
without their parents' knowledge. The plaintiff's parents learned
of the change nine weeks later, and removed the child from the
"9
 See, e.g., Keech v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d 464, 469, 210 Cal.
Rptr. 7, 9 (Ct. App. 1984) (handicapped student claimed that her school negligently applied
for special education services for her). Prosser and Keeton also note that when a statute or
administrative regulation provides for certain actions, a court can interpret it as fixing a
standard of behavior for members of the community. For a court to find a statutory legal
duty, a plaintiff must show that he or she is in the class of persons protected by the statute
and that he or she suffered a harm that the legislation contemplated. Some statutes are
designed merely to protect public interests and do not contemplate remedies for all injuries.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 35, at 220-23.
' 47
 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
"9
 B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 59-60, 649 P.2d 425, 427-28 (1982).
"9 Id. at 63-64, 649 P.2d at 427-28.
199 Id. at 60, 649 P.2d at 426-27.
1 " Id. at 61, 649 P.2d at 426-27.
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program.' 52 The plaintiffs claimed that their child had suffered
developmental setbacks as a result of the defendant's conduct.' 53
in support of its refusal to grant the defendant school's motion
for summary judgment, the B.M. court reasoned that absent any
public policy requirement limiting liability, the state constitution
permitted an action for negligence against a school board.' 54 The
court reasoned that article X of the Montana State constitution
mandated an educational system that would develop equally the full
potential of the state's students, and thereby, created a mandatory
duty and standard of care for public educators. The B.M. court
concluded that article X, combined with state legislation requiring
mandatory school attendance and a special education handbook on
administering special education programs, sufficiently defined a
duty of care that educators owed to special education students.' 55
In its rejection of the lower court's ruling that no legal duty of
care existed, the B.M. court reasoned that the plaintiff was in the
class of persons protected by the statutory provisions for special
education.' 56 Furthermore, the B.M. court concluded that the
school's failure to test and place the child in accordance with legis-
lated standards could subject it to liability.'" Although the B.M.
court did not rule on whether the school had breached the duty of
care or whether the plaintiff had suffered injury, the court did hold
that the state constitution mandated a duty of care to special needs
students.' 58 Thus, the B.M. court established that a duty of care can
be derived from state constitutional language.
152 Id. at 61-62, 649 P.2d at 426-27.
152 Id. at 62, 649 P.2d at 426-27.
15"




157 See Id. In 1990, the Montana Supreme Court, in Hayworth v. School Dist. No. I,
considered parents' claim alleging that school board officials failed to provide a safe educa-
tional environment for students in violation of article X of the Montana constitution. The
plaintiffs alleged that they had been forced to remove their child from the defendant's school
because of physical and verbal altercations. The court concluded that a new construction of
article X since B.M. dictated that immunity barred the plaintiffs' claim. Hayworth, 795 P.2d
470, 471-73 (Mont. 1990).
B.M., 200 Mont. at 63-64, 649 P.2d at 427-28; see also Donohue v. Copiague Union
Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 883-84 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47
N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979) (Suozzi, J., dissenting) (arguing that
New York regulations requiring state diploma recipients to complete a four year course of
study satisfactorily could be used as an educational standard); Walker v. Board of Educ. of
Olean City School Dist., 78 A.D.2d 982, 983, 433 N.Y.S.2d 660, 661 (App. Div. 1980) (stating
in dicta that where a statutory or constitutional provision is the basis of an educational
malpractice claim, review of the school board's decisions is proper).
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One commentator suggests that legislative accountability stan-
dards for educators exist, and courts can use them in educational
malpractice claims.'" Such legislated accountability programs, he
argues, attempt to quantify precisely a standard of care for educa-
tors in order to protect school children from the effects of careless
teaching. Thus, he asserts that accountability programs define con-
crete obligations that courts could use to establish educator liability
in malpractice actions.'"
In contrast, although some courts have reasoned that state
statutes are a basis for an educator's duty or standard of care, other
courts have reasoned that states never intended educational legis-
lation to support civil claims against school systems. 16 ' For example,
in 1977, the Illinois Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Board of Education
of Chicago, held that a student's claim that his school had failed to
place him in a special education program in violation of the state's
constitution did not state a cause of action.'" The court reasoned
that the statutory language promoting educational development of
all persons was not self-executing, and stated that additional legis-
lation was required before the court could conclude that it estab-
lished a mandatory duty,'" Therefore, the court concluded that the
state constitution's pronouncement was merely a statement of gen-
eral policy, and not a mandate that could create tort liability. The
court also noted that alternative statutory review procedures were
available, which the plaintiff had failed to pursue, and thus, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had not exhausted the adminis-
trative remedies.' 64 Thus, the Pierce court established that not all
legislative education enactments are intended to be a basis for civil
negligence claims against educators.
Similarly, in 1981, the Alaska Supreme Court, in D.S.W. v.
Fairbanks. North Star Borough School District, held that claims alleging
that a school had negligently classified, placed, and taught the plain-
1" See Valdes, supra note 2, at 283-84.
'n See id. See generally Liebman, Implementing Brown in the Nineties: Political Reconstruction,
Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 413-16.
(1990) (discussing the existence of minimum standards legislation as a basis for court-enforced
implementation).
16 ' See, e.g., Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1353, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377; see
also Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 826-27, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 862 (Ct, App. 1976); Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 69 III. 2d 89, 92-93,
370 N.E.2d 535, 536 (1977).
' 62 See 69 III. 2d at 94, 370 N.E.2d at 537.
' 63 Id. at 92-93, 370 N.E.2d at 536.
184 Id. at 94, 370 N.E.2d at 537.
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tiffs did not state a cause of action. 165 The plaintiffs in D.S.W., who
suffered from dyslexia, alleged that the defendant had negligently
terminated their special education courses in violation of Alaska's
Education for Exceptional Children Act. 166 As a result, the plaintiffs
claimed that they had suffered a loss of education, a loss of em-
ployment opportunity, a loss of opportunity to attend college, a loss
of earning ability, and mental anguish.' 67 Citing Peter W. and Smith,
the D.S.W. court reasoned that, because it was impossible to deter-
mine the children's academic success absent the defendants' con-
duct, the court was not able to determine legal causation. 168 In
rejecting the plaintiffs' claim, the D.S.W. court concluded that be-
cause the legislation provided for alternative administrative reme-
dies, it did not authorize a claim for monetary damages. 169 Thus,
the D.S.W. court established that some education statutes do not
provide for civil action, and thus, monetary damages are an inap-
propriate remedy for some educational injuries.'"
Thus, the courts that have considered the alternative argument
that they can derive a legal standard for educators from state con-
stitutional or statutory language have focused on legislative design.
Where they can determine that legislation protects children from
educational injuries, courts may reason that a duty of care exists
for education that, if breached, could result in tort liability. On the
other hand, if the legislature did not contemplate civil action and a
statute is purely administrative, courts have concluded that no duty
of care exists for educators, and thus, the court cannot sustain
educational malpractice claims.
c. Contractual Standard of Care
The third alternative theory for the source of a standard and
duty of care for educators is in contract law. Students claiming
educational injury while attending private institutions have claimed
165 628 P.2d 554, 554 (Alaska 1981).
166 Id. at 554-55.
167 Id. at 554.
1" Id. at 556.
169 See id. at 556-57; see also Keech v. Berkeley Unified School Dist., 162 Cal. App. 3d
464, 469, 210 Cal. Rptr. 7, 9 (Ct. App. 1984) (California education code was not designed to
protect students from monetary expenses of special education and sufficient alternative
administrative procedures were available); Lindsay v. Thomas, 465 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1983) (court concluded that monetary damages were unnecessary because other
remedies were available to ensure school compliance with the public school code).
17° See Keech, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 969, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 9; Lindsay, 465 A.2d at 124.
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that a court can measure their school's conduct against the terms
of their contract with the school."' These plaintiffs have argued
that a school's breach of the terms of their education contracts
demonstrates educational negligence and should result in liability.
In response to these claims, some courts have concluded that con-
tract claims alleging educational negligence are no different from
tort claims, and thus, have refused to recognize the contract claim
on public policy grounds." Other courts have recognized these
contract actions, reasoning that they require less judicial specula-
tion, and therefore, are capable of judicial review.'"
The first few breach of contract claims which were brought
against private educational institutions met with little success. For
example, in 1982, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, in Palandino v. Adelphi University, held that a student's claim
for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation against his
elementary school stated no cause of action. 14 After seven years at
the defendant's school, the plaintiff had evidenced learning prob-
lems, and had been sent to a private testing facility that had deter-
mined that he did not have grade level reading and math skills.'"
The plaintiff alleged that after the testing, the defendant had failed
to promote him, and that consequently, he had been forced to
repeat his grade in public school. The court reasoned that, as with
tort claims, educational malpractice contract claims required un-
warranted judicial interference in educational policy-making.' 76
Concluding that professional educators, not judges, were respon-
sible for determining educational methodology, the Palandino court
held that no contract action for educational negligence existed in
New York.' 77
The trial court reasoned that the defendant's conduct in Palan-
dino had not been discretionary, and therefore, it was subject to
judicial review.'" Noting that an educator-student relationship was
171 See, e.g., Swidryx v. St. Michael's Medical Center, 201 N.J. Super. 601, 603, 493 A,2d
641, 642 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985); Palandino v. Adelphi Univ., 89 A.D.2d 85, 86, 454
N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1982); Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting, No. 90AP-
264, 90AP-430 (Ohio App. Dec. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Omni file).
172 See infra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
173 See infra notes 193-211 and accompanying text.
' 74
 89 A.D.2d 85, 86, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 869-70 (App. Div. 1982), reversing 110 Misc.
2d 314, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1981).
175 Id. at 86, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 870.
176 Id. at 91-95, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73.
'" Id.
178 See id. at 315, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
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one-sided, the court reasoned that it should not provide educational
institutions with a safe haven from liability for their wrongful con-
duct. "9 Thus, the trial court found that the school had knowingly
and wrongfully deprived the student, and therefore, it could be
held liable for its conduct. ' 8°
On appeal, however, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, concluded that judicial non-interference in education was
a sound policy even when a claim was against a private institution.'"
Concluding that the plaintiff's claim required an analysis of the
defendant's educational function, the court refused to review the
school's conduct.' 82 Thus, Palandino established that when a private
educational institution's discretionary decision-making is the basis
of an educational negligence contract claim, public policy dictates
that no judicial review is permissible.' 83 Nevertheless, the lower
court's reasoning demonstrates that some courts have considered
contract claims for educational misconduct more justiciable than
,their tort counterparts.
According to the New York courts, the public policy rationale
for denying breach of contract educational negligence claims is
equally applicable where the defendant is a public guardian acting
in response to an educator's conduct. For example, in 1984, the
New York Court of Appeals, in Ton-es v. Little Flower Children's
Services, considered a functionally illiterate plaintiff's educational
malpractice claim against the New York City's Department of Social
Services ("DSS"), and a child care agency, and held that because of
public policy concerns the plaintiff had no cause of action. 18"
The plaintiff in Torres, abandoned at seven by his mother and
placed with DSS, alleged that after DSS had placed him with the
child care agency, the agency had assumed a contractual obligation
to provide him with an education.' 85 The plaintiff alleged that at
the time the agency had him tested and enrolled him in public
school it had known that he did not speak English and that he had
79 Id. at 315, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
180 See id. at 315-16, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 39.
181 Palandino, 89 A.D.2d at 89, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 871-72.
182 See id. at 92-93, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
183 See id. at 89-92, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73; see also Poe v. Hamilton, 56 Ohio App. 3d
137, 139, 565 N.E.2d 887, 889 (1990) (stating that the professional judgment of educators
in determining appropriate methods of teaching should not be disturbed).
'84 64 N.Y.2d 119, 124-25, 474 N.E.2d 223, 225, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15, 16 (1984), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 864 (1985).
183 Id. at 123, 474 N.E.2d at 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
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a learning disability.' 88 He also alleged that despite this knowledge,
and against a social worker's advice, the agency had failed to su-
pervise his testing and placement properly.' 87 Finally, the plaintiff
alleged that DSS had violated New York social services and educa-
tion laws requiring it to care for abandoned children, and that the
agency had violated its common-law duty as guardian.' 88
In holding that neither defendant was liable, the Torres court
reasoned that it could not review educators' discretionary decision-
making.'" Citing Donohue, the court concluded that although a tort
claim for educational malpractice was theoretically possible, it had
to fail because of public policy concerns. 19° The Torres court stated
that although students had the right to question educators' choices,
this right did not give rise to negligence claims. 19 ' Thus, Torres
established that legal custodians, acting in response to educators'
discretionary judgments, cannot be held liable for educational neg-
ligence or breach of educational contract in New York.' 92
In contrast, some courts have concluded that claims alleging
educational negligence as a breach of contract provide objective
standards for determining what conduct constituted due care for
educators, and thus, are permissible. For example, in 1981, the
California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in County of Riverside v.
Loma Linda University, considered a county's indemnification action
against a medical school for educational negligence, and held that
the plaintiff's cause of action was permissible.'" In Riverside, the
county claimed that the medical school had been negligent in dis-
charging its obligations under an affiliation agreement, which pro-
vided that the university would furnish its faculty's teaching services
to the county hospital to educate and train its medical personnel.'"
lee
	 id, at 123-24, 474 N.E.2d at 224, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 16.
' 187 See id. at 124-25, 474 N.E.2d at 224-25, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 16-17.
188 See id. at 125-26, 474 N.E.2d at 225-26, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 17-18.
189 See id at 126-27, 474 N.E.2d at 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19.
199 Id. at 128, 474 N.E.2d at 227, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
191 Id. at 127-28, 474 N.E.2d at 226-27, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 18; see also Smith v. Alameda
County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 942-43, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App.
1979) (court stated that the plaintiff's claim alleging breach of contract to educate as an
expressed beneficiary was subject to the same problems as negligence actions, and thus, was
not recognizable).
192 Id. at 126, 474 N.E.2d at 226-27, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 18-19. In his dissent, Judge Meyer
argued that the claim did not involve educational malpractice, but was a breach of custodial
duty and sustainable under New York law. See id. at 129-30, 474 N.E.2d at 228, 485 N.Y.S.2d
at 20 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
198 See 118 Cal. App. 3d 300, 318-19, 173 Cal. Rptr. 371, 380 (1981).
184 Id. at 308-09, 316, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 374, 379.
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The county alleged that the university had failed to educate, train
and supervise the hospital residents in breach of the agreement.' 95
Thus, the county alleged that the school had breached the terms of
its contract and should be held liable.
In holding for the county, the Riverside court reasoned that,
unlike earlier educational cases, the parties' affiliation agreement
had created a special relationship between the county and the
school.' 96 In addition, the court reasoned that the agreement pro-
vided the court with objective standards for determining what con-
duct constituted due care for the medical school.' 97 With the use of
expert testimony, the court determined within the constructs of the
contractual arrangement that the medical school had not trained
the residents according to the standards of practice for reasonable
medical teaching institutions.' 98 Thus, the Riverside court concluded
that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the university was negligent in discharging its contractual ob-
ligations to educate and train the county hospital's residents.' 99
Subsequent courts have further developed the idea that con-
tract terms can provide a court with a standard of care for educators
in educational negligence claims. 29° For example, in 1984, the Civil
Court of the City of New York, in Village Community School v. Adler,
considered a counterclaim against a private school for breach of
contract and found the claim permissible.20 ' In Adler, a parent al-
leged that a school's agents had represented that the school pos-
sessed a specialized facility that could identify and treat children
with learning disabilities, and that the school had failed to properly
treat her child. The Adler court reasoned that because the defendant
had made certain promises to the parent, its activities were no
longer discretionary, but required full contract performance. 202 The
' 9' See id. at 317-18, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
'" Id. at 319 n.7, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 379-80 n.7.
197 See id.; see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (N.D. Ill. 1990)
(stating in dicta that where a school breaches an expressed contractual provision the court
might find a school liable); Wickstrom v. North Idaho College, 111  Idaho 450, 452-53 &
n.1, 725 P.2d 155, 157-58 & n.1 (1986) (stating in dicta that if the terms of an implied
contract between a student and a private school, i.e., a school catalogue, were breached, a
valid claim could exist).
' 98 See Riverside, 118 Cal. App. 3d at 317-18, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
199 Id.
2" See, e.g., Village Community School v. Adler, 124 Misc. 2d 817, 819, 478 N.Y.S.2d
546, 548 (Civ. Ct. 1984).
201 Id. at 818, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 547.
202 Id. at 819, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 548.
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court concluded that because a contractual relationship had existed
between the parties, the court did not have to review the educator's
discretionary activities, and thus, the claim was permissible. The
Adler court established that if a school represents itself as possessing
specialized knowledge and abilities, it can be held liable for failure
to perform such duties.
In addition, one court has concluded that if a plaintiff can
phrase his contract claim against an educational institution so as not
to mention the words educational negligence or malpractice, it may
be permissible. In 1990, the Ohio Court of Appeals, in Malone v.
Academy of Court Reporting, considered students' claims against a
paralegal institute that alleged breach of contract and consumer
fraud, and held that the plaintiffs had a cause of action."' The
plaintiffs in Malone had enrolled in defendant's school, alleging that
the defendant had represented that it was certified to teach paral-
egal studies, and that completion of its course would qualify them
to be paralegals. 214 In addition, the plaintiffs alleged that the school
had claimed to have admissions standards, job placement services,
and hours that were transferable to the state university. All of the
students had attended the school for a year until they discovered
that the state officials had not accredited the schoo1. 205
 When the
plaintiffs discovered it was not accredited, had been given mislead-
ing and inaccurate answers, and had been unable to obtain legal
positions, they sued the defendant for breach of contract and
fraud. 2°6
The Malone court overturned the trial court's finding that the
claims were for educational negligence, and thus, held that the
plaintiffs' claims were permissible. 207
 The court reasoned that be-
cause the plaintiffs had not mentioned educational negligence or
malpractice in their claim, it was a breach of contract claim. 20" The
court further reasoned that the subject matter did not require the
court to defer to state agency expertise by dismissing the claim. 209
Concluding that the existence of administrative remedies did not
preclude common-law remedies, the court remanded the case for
2"5
 No. 90AP-264, 90AP-430, slip op. at 10 (Ohio App. Dec. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, States
library, Omni file).
204
 Id. at 2-3.
2n
 Id. at 3.
2"3 Id.
207 Id.
"4' Id. at 10.
Id. at 7.
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further proceeding. 21 ° Therefore, Malone established that where a
plaintiff's breach of contract claim against an educator does not
mention the words negligence or malpractice, the court may permit
jot'
Thus, courts have evolved a theory that contract terms can be
a basis for a standard of care for educators. A few courts have
concluded that contract claims based on educational negligence are
subject to the same public policy concerns as tort claims and are not
recognizable. 212
 Other courts, however, have concluded that con-
tracts with private schools can provide a standard of care for edu-
cators. 213
 These courts have held that if a school is negligent in
meeting its contractual obligations to educate, then an action for
breach of contract may be viable.
In sum, creation of an educational standard of care is a greatly
debated element of the preventative public policy considerations
that the Donohue court identified. In considering educational mal-
practice claims, courts have looked to common-law, statutory lan-
guage, or contractual terms for a standard and duty of care. 214
Those courts that have concluded that education is unlike other
professions, and that jurors cannot understand educational meth-
odology, have held that no professional standard of care for edu-
cators exists. 2 ' 5
 Other majority and minority opinions have reasoned
that educators are similar to other professionals, and thus, they
should be subjected to a standard of care as determined from other
educators' conduct. 216
Where courts and justices have determined that legislation ex-
ists to protect children from educational injuries, they have con-
cluded that an educator's conduct can be measured against its pro-
visions. 217
 Where, however, courts have concluded that the
enactment did not contemplate civil action and was purely admin-
istrative, they have refused to. recognize a cause of action based on
215 Id. at 8, 12.
2" Id. at 9-10.
2" See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
419
	 supra notes 193-211 and accompanying text.
4I4 See cases supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 112-29 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' negative
treatment of a common-law standard of care for educators.
216 See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' positive
treatment of a common-law standard of care for educators.
2" See supra notes 145-58 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' positive
treatment of a statutory standard of care for educators.
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statutory violation. 2 ' 8
 Finally, courts have concluded that where the
terms of contracts with private institutions provide specific objec-
tives for educators' conduct, plaintiffs' claims avoid the problems
that educational negligence tort actions raise, and therefore,' are
recognizable. 21 °
2. Proving Proximate Cause
Another preventative consideration of public policy that the
Donohue court enumerated, and that subsequent courts have dis-
cussed, is the difficulty in proving causation. 22° In Donohue, the New
York Supreme Court reasoned that the defendant's negligent teach-
ing had not clearly caused the plaintiff's illiteracy because his class-
mates had learned in the same environment. 22 ' The Donohue court
further reasoned that because it was impossible to demonstrate that
the defendant's breach of duty to teach properly was the proximate
cause of the student's failure to learn, the plaintiff had no cause of
action. 222
 Thus, the Donohue court established the proposition that
education defies accepted legal methods of proving causation, and
therefore, is not subject to malpractice actions.
At least one court has concluded that because one cannot de-
termine a child's academic success absent a school's wrongful con-
duct, it is impossible to prove or disprove legal cause. In 1981, the
Alaska Supreme Court, in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough
School District, refused to recognize a negligent teaching cause of
action because of the difficulty of proving causation. 22' The court,
citing Peter W. and Donohue, adopted the reasoning that because a
host of subjective factors affects a student during his or her edu-
cation, a court cannot determine causation in educational claims. 224
210 Sec supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts' negative
treatment of a statutory standard of care for educators.
2 " See supra notes 171-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the courts'
treatment of a contractual standard of care for educators.
220 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 877 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1979); Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824-25,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (Ct. App. 1976).
221 See Donahue, 64 A.D.2d at 39, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
222
 See id.; see also Poe v. Hamilton, 56 Ohio App. 3d 137, 138-39, 565 N.E.2d 887, 889
(1990).
222 628 P.2d 554, 554 (Alaska 1981).
224 Id. at 555-56.
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Thus, the D.S.W. court established that causation in educational
negligence cases is beyond the Alaskan courts' ability. 225
Some commentators are in agreement with the Donohue and
D.S.W. courts' reasoning that proximate cause in the context of
education is impossible to prove. 226 For example, one commentator
argues that because the causes of non-learning are numerous and
beyond the average layjuror's understanding, complex expert tes-
timony would weigh down educational malpractice trials. 227 He fur-
ther asserts that in the absence of scientific evidence, and profes-
sional consensus on pedagogical methodology, jury verdicts on
causation would be arbitrary. 228 Concluding that many variables
interact during the lengthy period of a child's education, and that
no connection exists between teacher quality and cognitive skills,
this commentator asserts that educational causation is incapable of
proof. 229
In contrast to these conclusions of causal impossibility, the New
York Court of Appeals, in Donohue, stated that although causation
in the educational context may be difficult to prove, it assumes too
much to conclude that it can never be established. 25° Furthermore,
in B.M. v. State, the Montana Supreme Court concluded that the
question of whether the state had breached a duty of care to the
plaintiff, and whether that breach was the cause of the plaintiff's
injury was a material question of fact for tria1. 23 ' Thus, some courts
have concluded that educational causation is not impossible to prove
and should be submitted to the trier of fact.
In support of the conclusion that proximate cause is a question
for trial, one commentator notes that medical malpractice actions
raise troublesome causation questions, and yet, that controversy
does not immunize physicians from liability arising from their mis-
225 See id. at 556; see also Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ill.
1990) (reasoning that education is a collaborative process requiring a large amount of co-
operation between student and teacher, and thus, ultimately, the student always has respon-
sibility for his or her academic success).
22" See Funston, supra note 2, at 784-90.
227 Id. at 787-88.
22' See id. at 788-89.
22' Id. at 789-90.
23" See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979); see also Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New
York, 49 N.Y.S.2d 121, 127, 400 N.E.2d 317, 321, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 380 (1979) (Meyers, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that because reevaluation was an important part of the defendant's
procedure, the court should have viewed failure to retest as the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injuries).
23' 200 Mont. 58, 60, 649 1).2d 425, 426 (1982).
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conduct. 232 Thus, he argues that educators should not be shielded
from liability due to the difficulties of proving proximate cause in
education."' Furthermore, he asserts that educators should not be
treated differently than other professionals at the expense of in-
jured children. 234
Another commentator suggests that a plaintiff claiming edu-
cational malpractice should have the opportunity to offer evidence
proving causation to the jury. 235 He asserts that plaintiffs could
submit evidence of their educability, their test scores demonstrating
below basic skills, documentation of other comparable students'
achievement, and research and testimony of alternative educational
methodologies that might lead to an inference of causation. He
concludes that such evidence could establish a prima facie case that
a school's failure to follow community standards was a proximate
cause of a child's failure to learn. Ultimately, he argues that whether
a school system, or outside forces, caused a child's failure to achieve
a basic level of literacy is a question of proof to be resolved at
tria1. 236
Thus, the debate over the public policy consideration of the
difficulty of showing proximate cause has centered on the perceived
ease or difficulty of isolating the factors affecting a child's academic
success."' Some courts have reasoned that educational malpractice
defies a causation analysis because it involves the interaction of many
factors over a number of years. Other courts have suggested that
education is no more complex than other professions, and there-
fore, that causation is a question for the trier of fact. 233
3. The Existence of Educational Injury
The final elements of the preventative considerations of public
policy that the Donohue court identified are the foreseeability and
assessment of alleged educational injury. 239 The debate in this area
252 See Jerry, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: Problems of Theory and Policy, 29
KAN. L. REV. 195, 203 (1981).
255 Id. at 206-07.
254 Id.
255 Ratner, supra note 142, at 857.
256 See id. at 557-58.
257 See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impossibility
of proving proximate cause in educational malpractice claims.
25" See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the possibility of
proving proximate cause in educational malpractice claims.
255 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (App. Div. 1978), aff , 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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has focused on whether children have actually suffered injuries in
cases where schools have acted negligently and, if so, whether such
injuries are measurable. In 1978, the New York Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, in Donohue, stated that because every child is
born lacking knowledge, education, and experience, the failure of
educational achievement is not a tortious injury. 240
 Therefore, the
Donohue court concluded that a plaintiff had no cause of action for
educational malpractice or breach of a statutory duty to educate
against his school.
In addition, some courts have further reasoned that because
educational injuries are immeasurable, the courts should not allow
a civil remedy for educational negligence. 241
 For example, in 1982,
the Maryland Court of Appeals, in Hunter v. Board of Education of
Montgomery County, stated that damages resulting from educational
negligence were inherently immeasurable. 242 Citing Peter W., the
Hunter court concluded that it could not determine the nature of
educational injuries, and thus, dismissed the plaintiff's action. 2"
At least one commentator has supported the Donohue and
Hunter courts' position that educational injuries are nonexistent or
immeasurable. 244
 He asserts that the educational malpractice plain-
tiff only has lost an expectancy interest, or has failed to receive a
benefit, and that the law of torts generally compensates neither of
these interests. In addition, he argues that it is almost impossible to
calculate the monetary loss or damages that result from non-learn-
ing. He further asserts that if plaintiffs characterize educational
injuries as lost self-esteem, then the value of literacy to an individual
is speculative, and its loss does not warrant legal damages. 245
 lf, on
the other hand, loss is in terms of lost expected income, he asserts,
it is a mere expectation, and also does not warrant damages. Thus,
this commentator concludes that alleged educational injuries, if
recognizable at all, are immeasurable and should not be compen-
sated.246
14° Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 37, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 880; see also Peter W. v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 824-25, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976).
24 ' See, e.g., Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 585-86
(Md. 1982); see also Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929,
942-43, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979).
142 439 A.2d at 585-86.
R4,4 Id.
2" See Funston, supra note 2, at 783.
245 Id. at 784.
2 ' 6 See id.
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In contrast, some courts have suggested that students can suffer
measurable injuries as a result of educational malpractice. 247 For
example, the New York Court of Appeals, in Donohue, stated in
dicta that a graduating high school student who could not compre-
hend simple English had undeniably suffered injuries. 245 Although
concluding that educational malpractice claims could not be rec-
ognized for public policy reasons, the Donohue court suggested that
one could prove measurable injuries from educational malprac-
tice. 249
Furthermore, in his Hunter dissent, Judge Davidson argued that
Maryland courts had historically recognized mental and emotional
distress injuries and lost earning potential despite the difficulty and
speculativeness of such computations.25° Judge Davidson reasoned
that the plaintiff in Hunter claiming educational negligence should
be treated no differently than other victims of non-intentional torts,
and should receive damages. 251
 He, therefore, concluded that the
difficulty in measuring injuries for educational malpractice claims
should not prevent recovery, and thus, a viable cause of action
should exist for educational malpractice. 252
Some commentators have agreed that educational injuries are
measurable within the existing legal framework. 255
 Difficulty in as-
sessing damages, one commentator argues, is not a forceful reason
for refusing to recognize a tort of educational malpractice where
injury has resulted. 254
 He suggests that calculation of lost future
earnings of a student who cannot obtain meaningful employment
is not impossible. 255
 Also, he notes that courts have considered
447
	 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979); see also Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"a Donahue, 47 N.Y.2d at 443, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 377.
239
 See Id.; see also Doe v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814, 814
(Md. 1982) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (student suffered measurable severe and permanent
injury as the result of the defendant school's negligent conduct).
25° See Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Pierce v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 44 Ill. App. 3d 324, 326, 358 N.E.2d 67, 69
(1976) (court refused to deny damages for educational emotional injury that was not accom-
panied by physical injury), reed, 69 Ill, 2c1 89, 370 N.E.2d 535 (1977).
251 See Hunter, 439 A.2d at 589 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252 Id.
253 See Jerry, supra note 232, at 203; Elson, supra note 49, at 759-61. When courts
consider education a marital asset to be divided between spouses pursuant to a divorce
settlement, courts place value on skills or education insofar as they affect future earning
capacity. Id.
254 See Jerry, supra note 232, at 203.
255 See id. at 206-07.
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education a marital asset to be divided between spouses in divorce
settlements and they have placed a value on education as an element
of earning capacity. 25° Furthermore, he argues that courts have
awarded damages to children whom medical personnel have in-
jured, and concludes that courts can also do so for educational
malpractice claimants. 257
Overall, the existence and measurability of injury resulting
from negligent instruction is a subject of debate among courts and
commentators. A few courts have concluded that a lack of a proper
education leaves a child no worse off than before he or she attended
school, and consequently, the child has not suffered a legally rec-
ognizable injury. 258
 Other courts have reasoned that lack of aca-
demic achievement, like medical injury, is a measurable injury that
the law should compensate. 259
In sum, jurisdictions confronting educational malpractice
claims continue to debate the first category of preventative public
policy considerations that the Donohue court identified. Courts' con-
cern over the judiciary's ability to determine a standard of care for
educators, to prove proximate cause, and to measure the alleged
injury from educational negligence has affected their decision to
recognize or deny the new cause of action. Although a majority of
courts have concluded that proving the elements of an educational
tort are impossible, others have reasoned that it is no more difficult
than proving the elements in other professional malpractice actions.
B. Moral Considerations: Judicial Involvement, the Student-Teacher
Relationship, and Education's Social Utility
The second category of public policy concerns that the Donohue
court identified was moral considerations. 26° These considerations
concerned the degree to which courts should be involved in the
regulation of education. This category also included society's view
2" Id. at 203 n.72. See generally, Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education:
Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379, 388-89 (1980)
(discussing the increased legal protection for an individual's proprietary interest in his own
skills); Note, Spousal Interests in Professional Degrees: Solving the Compensation Dilemma, 31 B.C.L.
REV, 749, 756-59 (1990) (degree or license is marital property subject to valuation and
division).
257 See Jerry, supra note 232, at 206-07; see also Collingsworth, supra note 50, at 502-03.
2" See supra notes 240-43 and accompanying text.
25" See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
2"" Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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toward the student-teacher relationship, and education's social util-
ity. The first moral element of public policy, that of the proper
degree of judicial interference, has received the most attention in
court opinions. In Donohue, the New York Supreme Court con-
cluded that the judicial system was an inappropriate forum in which
to test the efficacy of educational programs and pedagogical meth-
ods. 26 ' On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's holding, concluding that recognition of the cause of
action would have been blatant interference with the state school
administrative agencies' responsibilities .262
Subsequent courts have concurred with Donohue that it is not
within the judicial function to evaluate the conflicting educational
theories that necessarily arise in educational malpractice claims. 263
For example, in 1979, the New York Court of Appeals in Hoffman
v. Board of Education of New York, considered an educational mal-
practice claim alleging that a school had negligently tested a nor-
mally intelligent student suffering from a speech defect, and as a
result had misplaced him in a class for the mentally retarded. 2"
The court reasoned that it should not evaluate educational policies,
and thereby substitute its judgment, or a jury's judgment, for that
of professional educators. 265 As a result, the Hoffman court con-
cluded that public policy dictated that the plaintiff had no cause of
action for educational malpractice. 266
The plaintiff in Hoffman alleged that the defendant had en-
rolled him in a class for the mentally retarded despite contrary
recommendations and had failed to retest him for thirteen years. 267
At the plaintiff's mother's request, the defendant finally had the
plaintiff retested, and discovered that he was not retarded. As a
result of the retesting, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had
forced him to leave his occupational training program after thirteen
years. The plaintiff further claimed that he had suffered severe
injury to his emotional and intellectual well-being, as well as a loss
vei Id. at 35-36, 407 N.Y,S.2d at 878-79.
262 Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 391 N.E.2d at 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
In See, e.g., Moore v. Vanderloo, 389 N.W.2d 108, 115 (Iowa 1986); Hunter v. Board
of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982); Palandino v. Adelphi Univ.,
89 A.D.2d 85, 91-92, 459 N.Y.S.2d 868, 872-73 (App. Div. 1982).
2" 49 N.Y.2d 121, 123-25, 400 N.E.2d 317, 320, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1979), reversing
64 A.D.2d 369, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1978).
266 See id. at 125-27, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
366 Id. at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 317, 424 N.Y,S.2d at 378.
262 Id. at 124, 400 N.E.2d at 318-19, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 377-78.
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of employment opportunity, as a result of the defendant's con-
duct. 268
The trial court stated that negligence was negligence, and rea-
soned that the trier of fact had to determine whether the defendant
had failed to follow its own recommendations for retesting the
student. It concluded that if the defendant was found to have
violated such standards it could be held liable. 269 The court refused
to give greater weight to the private value judgments of a public
policy analysis than to an injured person's legitimate legal rights. 27°
The court distinguished Hoffman from Donohue and Peter W., con-
cluding that the school's failure to follow its own retesting procedure
in Hoffman was misfeasance, and not the nonfeasance that the
schools in Donohue and Peter W. had committed. Thus, the trial
court concluded in Hoffman that the school could be held liable for
affirmative negligence. 27 '
On appeal, however, the Hoffman court stated that the public
policy considerations that had prompted its Donohue decision ap-
plied with equal force to educational malpractice actions, whether
based upon allegations of educational misfeasance or nonfeas-
ance. 272 The court stated its opposition to judicial review of what it
perceived as professional educators' complex and delicate discre-
tionary decision-making, and refused to recognize the plaintiff's
cause of action. 278 Thus, Hoffman established that educational mal-
practice claims, alleging misfeasance or nonfeasance, necessitate
unwarranted judicial interference and oversight in educational pol-
icy-making, and therefore, these claims are not recognizable in New
York. 274
As justification for their views regarding judicial non-interfer-
ence in education, courts have stated that more appropriate reme-
2" Id. at 125, 400 N.E.2d at 319, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
2" See Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 69 A.D.2d 369, 385-86, 410 N.Y.S.2d
99, 110 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
27°
	 at 386, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
271 See id. at 386, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
272
 Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 126, 400 N.E.2d at 320, 924 N.Y.S.2d at 379.
275 See id. at 125-27, 400 N.E.2d at 320-21, 924 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79; see also Torres v.
Little Flower Children's Servs., 64 N.Y.2d 119, 126, 474 N.E.2d 223, 226, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15,
18 (1984) (court concluded that it could not be responsible for evaluating educational policies
when elusive factors such as a student's motivation, attitude, temperament, past experience
and home environment were involved); cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).
2" See Hoffman, 49 N.Y.2d at 126-27, 400 N.E.2d at 320-21, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 379; see
also DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592, 599, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (App. Div.
1987).
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dies than civil actions are available for plaintiffs who have suffered
alleged educational injuries. 275 For example, in Donohue, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, stated that the plaintiff's
failing report card grades should have prompted his parents to
begin administrative proceedings. 276 In addition, on appeal, the
New York Court of Appeals in Donohue concluded that the plaintiff
should have sought review of his academic progress from the com-
missioner of education as allowed by state law and should not have
resorted to the courts. 277
Similarly, in Hunter v. Board of Education of Montgomery County,
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals held that there was no civil
cause of action for educational malpractice, reasoning that other
more desirable methods to settle such disputes were available. 278
Citing state legislative history, the Hunter court concluded that stu-
dent classification and placement were intended to be handled in-
formally through the administrative process, not through civil ac-
tion.279 The Hunter court also reasoned that prompt administrative
and judicial review could correct erroneous educational practices
and obviate the need for monetary damages. 28° Monetary damages,
the Hunter court concluded, were a poor substitute for a proper
education.28 ' Thus, proponents of judicial non-interference have
used the existence of alternative administrative remedies as justifi-
cation for refusing to recognize a civil cause of action for educa-
tional malpractice.
Opponents to judicial non-intervention have argued, however,
that judicial intervention in cases of educational negligence is nec-
essary because alternative remedies are not a substitute for the
damages that a plaintiff might receive in civil action. 282 For example,
275 See, e.g., Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 445, 391
N.E.2d 1352, 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 378 (1979), aff'g 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874
(App. Div. 1978); see also Lindsay v. Thomas, 465 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983)
(concluding that a claim against a school district for violation,of public school code's special
education provisions was not permissible because alternative remedies were available to
plaintiff).
278 See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 38, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 881.
277 See Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 445, 391 N.E.2d at 1355, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
276 439 A.2d 582, 586 (Md. 1982).
279 Id.; see also Lindsay, 465 A.2d at 124.
28° Hunter, 439 A.2d at 586.
221 Id.; see also D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 557
(Alaska 1981) (concluding that the administrative process provided for an independent
examination and evaluation, and a hearing that was sufficient remedy to correct a school's
wrongful conduct, and thus, that monetary damages were inappropriate).
2B5 See Hunter, 439 A.2d at 590 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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in Judge Davidson's Hunter dissent, he argued that there were no
adequate administrative procedures in the educational system to
compensate educational injuries. He further argued that adminis-
trative procedures did not address the problem of incompetent
teaching, or provide adequate relief to a student already injured,
and consequently, the court should have recognized an educational
malpractice cause of action. 283
One commentator agrees that administrative remedies do not
compensate educationally-injured plaintiffs. 284
 She suggests that
parents and their children are unlikely to take advantage of existing
administrative procedures. 285
 Plaintiffs in educational claims, she
asserts, lack a great degree of sophistication and will defer to edu-
cators without challenging the educators' decisions. 288 In addition,
she argues that some parents and students may not have access to
the independent professional help and financial resources necessary
to challenge educational policies through the administrative pro-
cess.287
 Thus, she asserts, administrative remedies should not pre-
clude civil actions for educational malpractice.288
In sum, courts have concluded that judicial intervention is an
important element of the public policy debate surrounding the
acceptance of a cause of action for educational malpractice. A ma-
jority of courts have reasoned that judicial oversight of education
would invite an unwarranted substitution of judicial judgment for
legislative decision-making. 289 These courts point to alternative rem-
edies to civil actions for injured students as a justification for their
decision. 29° In contrast, however, opponents of judicial non-inter-
vention have argued that such administrative alternatives do not
satisfy the injured parties' immediate needs, and therefore, are not
a substitute for civil action. 29 '
The remaining two moral considerations of public policy that
the Donohue court identified are the relationship between students
283 Id.; see also Doe v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814,823 (Md.
1982) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (arguing that money was not an inappropriate remedy in a
misplacement claim because the plaintiff needed .psychological treatment and special edu-
cation, neither of which the school provided and both of which cost money).
284
 Comment, Hoffman v. Board of Education, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279,300-04 (1981).
283 Id. at 301.
286 See ed. at 301-02.
287 See id. at 302-03.
288
	 id. at 303-04.
2" See supra notes 261-74 and accompanying text.
29' See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text.
29 ' See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text.
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and educators, and education's social utility. 292 A majority of the
jurisdictions that have considered educational claims have not dis-
cussed these elements in detail. A few courts have recognized that
the relationship between state educators and their pupils is often
unequal and requires special judicial attention. 293 In Hoffman, the
New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in a majority opinion
later reversed on appeal, reasoned that insulating educational ent-
ities from the legal responsibilities of other government agencies
subrogated the tortiously injured student's legitimate interests and
legal rights to those of the institution. 294 Therefore, the lower Hoff-
man court concluded that it was not unreasonable to hold a school
board liable when a student suffered injury. 295
Similarly, at least one court has acknowledged that the activities
of powerful public institutions, such as state education agencies,
increasingly affect our society. In Smith v. Alameda County Social
Services Agency, the California Court of Appeal, in considering an
educational negligence claim against a government agency and
school district, suggested in dicta that state institutional accounta-
bility was of considerable significance in maintaining a free soci-
ety. 296 The court further suggested that agency regulation was par-
ticularly important when the agency exercised control over children
who were unable to protect themselves. Thus, although the Smith
court refused to recognize the cause of action, it recognized that
judicial scrutiny and agency accountability was a growing trend. 2"
Only a few courts and justices have discussed education's social
utility in the context of educational malpractice claims. In Hunter v.
Board of Education of Montgomery County, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals noted in dicta that a serious social problem existed
when illiterate students were promoted through school. 298 Although
292 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (App. Div. 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 ( 1979).
295 See, e.g., Palandino v. Adelphi Univ., 110 Misc. 2d 314, 315, 442 N.Y.S.2d 38, 38-39
(Sup. Ct. 1981), rev'd, 89 A.D.2d 85, 454 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1982); see also Pierce v. Board of
Educ. of Chicago, 44 111. App. 3d 324, 326, 358 N.E.2d 67, 68 (App. Ct. 1976) (stating that
the plaintiff, being a minor, was entitled to a high degree of care from the board of education,
and from the trial judge), rev'd, 69 III. 2d 73, 370 N.E.2d 537 (1977).
294 See Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 64 A.D.2d 369, 385-86, 410 N.Y.S.2d
99, 110 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd, 49 N.Y.2d 121, 400 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
295 Id. at 387, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
296 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 938, 153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 717 (Ct. App. 1979).
297 Id. at 938-39, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
292 47 Md. App. 709, 716, 425 A.2d 681, 684 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981), modified, 439 A.2d
582 (Md. 1982).
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the Hunter court quoted Thomas Jefferson's statement that a nation
cannot be both free and ignorant, it concluded that the danger was
not great enough to warrant recognition of a cause of action for
educational malpractice. 299
Thus, only a few courts have discussed the public policy ele--
ments of the relationship between educator and student, and the
social utility of education. Those courts that have addressed these
elements have reasoned that although the growing threat of illit-
eracy is serious, it does not warrant recognition of an action for
educational negligence."°
In sum, the moral considerations that the Donohue court iden-
tified, and that subsequent courts have discussed, include judicial
intervention, the student-teacher relationship, and education's so-
cial utility.391 Although a majority of jurisdictions considering edu-
cational malpractice claims have weighted the value or harm of
judicial oversight, few have considered the remaining two ele-
ments. 302 Those courts that have discussed education's social utility
and the student-teacher relationship have reasoned that even
though illiteracy is a grave threat, it does not warrant recognition
of an action in tort.
C. EconomiclAthrtinistrative Considerations
The final two public policy categories that the Donohue court
enumerated are comprised of economic and administrative consid-
erations. 303 Economic considerations that courts have discussed fo-
cus on schools' ability to respond to damages in malpractice claims.
Administrative considerations discussed by the courts include their
ability to cope with a possible flood of litigation, and the probability
of feigned claims.
Courts have stated that recognition of a cause of action for
educational malpractice would expose both courts and defendants
2" Id. at 716, 425 A.2d at 684-85. But see Hunter, 439 A.2d 582, 590 (Davidson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the failure of schools has reached
massive proportions, society has suffered social and moral problems, and therefore, courts
should recognize a cause of action for educational malpractice).
3" See, e.g., Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 825,
131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976) (refusing to agree that schools bear responsibility
for many of society's social and moral problems); see also cases cited supra notes 293, 294,
298 and accompanying text.
301
 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
877 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
"2 See supra notes 261-300 and accompanying text.
'°' See, e.g., Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 32, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
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to disaffected students' innumerable real or feigned tort claims. 504
Some courts have concluded that recognition ultimately would bur-
den the public tremendously in terms of time and money. 303 Thus,
these courts have concluded that no cause of action for educational
malpractice existed. 3"
Moreover, a number of courts have dismissed educational mal-
practice claims because of the administrative fear of excessive liti-
gation resulting from recognition of such claims. For example, the
Hunter court expressed concern that if it recognized educational
malpractice claims, such claims would arise every time a child failed
a grade, subject, or test, resulting in teachers spending more time
in courtrooms than in classrooms. 307 Similarly, in 1990, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, in Ross v.
Creighton University, denied a student-athlete's claim alleging negli-
gent infliction of emotional distress against a university for negli-
gently recruiting and enrolling him. 308 The plaintiff alleged that
the school had enrolled him without providing substantial tutoring,
and thus, he was incapable of performing the required academic
work. The Ross court reasoned that because education is rendered
on such an immense scale, and requires a high degree of student
cooperation, it is unlike any other profession. 90° Consequently, the
Ross court reasoned that recognition of educational malpractice
would mean a real danger of unrestrained and numerous lawsuits,
and thus, the court held that Illinois could not recognize the
claim. 3 '°
In contrast ; some have argued that even if recognition of ed-
ucational malpractice results in a flood of litigation, 3 " the court
3" See, e.g., Peter W., 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
3" See, e.g., Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979) (claim against a public agency and school); Moore
v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114-15 (Iowa 1986) (doctor's educational malpractice within
a medical malpractice claim); Rich v. Kentucky County Day School, 793 S.W.2d 832, 836
(Ky. Ct. App. 1990) (claim against a private school).
3°6 See, e.g., Smith , 90 Cal. App. 3d at 941, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 719; Moore, 386 N.W.2d at
114-15.
" Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 47 Md. App. 709, 715-16, 425
A.2d 681, 684-85 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981), modified, 439 A.2d 582 (Md. 1982).
3" 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. III. 1990).
3°
 Id. at 1329.
51 ° Id. at 1329-30.
5 " See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 41-42, 407 N.Y.S.2d
874, 883 (App. Div. 1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352,
418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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must still remedy wrongs that deserve it. 312
 For example, Judge
Suozzi argued in his Donohue dissent that a fear of a flood of liti-
gation was meritless, and a court should not dismiss a cause of
action in educational malpractice on this basis. 313
 To support his
argument, he cited the abolition of sovereign immunity in New
York as an example that refuted the fear of excessive litigation that
a new zone of liability generated. 314
 Consequently, he argued that
courts, as in other malpractice cases, should recognize claims of
negligence against educational institutions .3 15
In sum, the economic and administrative public policy consid-
erations that the Donohue court identified, and that subsequent
courts have discussed in their analysis of educational malpractice,
include the possibility of a flood of new litigation and its societal
cost. 316
 Some opinions have suggested that education is so unique
as to present more difficult financial and practical problems than
other malpractice claims, and, as a result, it should not be subject
to malpractice claims. 317
 Others have argued that a questionable
fear of a flood of litigation is an insufficient reason to deny a remedy
for a child's injury resulting from an educator's wrongful con-
duct. 318
III. PARALLEL FACT PATTERNS?: OTHER PROFESSIONAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Although a majority of plaintiffs alleging negligence in edu-
cational testing, placement, or instruction have done so under the
theory of educational malpractice, some plaintiffs have brought
3 " See Hunter, 439 A.2d 582, 590 (Md. 1982) (Davidson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (reasoning that no empirical evidence supports similar flood of litigation
arguments in cases that recognized students' constitutional rights); see also Doe v. Board of
Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814, 823 (Md. 1982) (Eldridge, J., dissenting) (citing
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 12 at 51 (4th ed. 1971)) (concluding that
denying relief to deserving plaintiffs on the grounds that such relief will deluge the system
was "a pitiful confession of incompetence on the part of the court...").
"' Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 41-42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
3 " Id. at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883. See generally Collingsworth, supra note 50, at 503-04
(discussing the removal of blanket immunity from state agencies and the inconsistencies of
a "flood of litigation" argument against educational malpractice).
313
 See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 42, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 883. See generally Elson, supra note 49,
at 652-54 (discussing the weaknesses inherent in the "flood of litigation" argument).
313 Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
5 ' 7 See supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text.
315 See supra notes 311-15 and accompanying text.
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similar claims under the theory of medical malpractice.yt' In addi-
tion, some courts, on their own initiative, have relabeled educational
malpractice-like claims as medical malpractice and found them to
be recognizable. 32° Negligent evaluation or treatment claims against
educators that the courts have accepted as medical malpractice,
have, in fact, met with more success than their educational coun-
terparts. 921
For example, in 1983, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Snow v. State, considered a child's negligence claim
against two state-run schools, and held that the plaintiff had an
actionable claim for medical malpractice. 322 In Snow, the plaintiff
alleged that on the basis of an I.Q. test, the defendant had negli-
gently diagnosed and misplaced him in handicapped classes for six
years until it was discovered that he was not retarded, but merely
deaf.323 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had failed to reev-
aluate him despite reports indicating that he had demonstrated
questionable hearing.'" The plaintiff further claimed that he had
suffered mental and physical injury as a result of the school's con-
duct. 325
Reasoning that the children at the state schools had been under
continuous treatment, and that their medical insurance had paid
their bills, the Snow court concluded that the action against the
schools was medical, rather than educational, malpractice. 326
Through the use of expert testimony, the Snow court further de-
termined that the school's failure to reevaluate the student was more
than just an error of professional judgment. 327
 Thus, the court
concluded, that the schools had failed to exercise reasonable care,
and their conduct had departed from accepted medical stan-
dards. 928
In holding that the plaintiff had a valid claim, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, distinguished the plaintiff in
313 See, e.g., Savino v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1, 123 A.D.2d 314, 314-15,
506 N.Y.S.2d 210, 211-12 (App. Div. 1986).
"ll See, e.g., Snow v. State, 98 A.D.2d 442, 447, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962 (App. Div. 1983),
aff'd, 64 N.Y.2d 753, 475 N.E.2d 454, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984).
321 See generally Loscalzo, supra note 48, at 599-601 (discussion of Sriow v. State as the
initial breakdown of the public policy barrier to recognition of educational malpractice).
322 Snow, 98 A.D.2d at 443-44, 447, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960, 962.
32' Id. at 443-44, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
324 Id. at 444, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
323 Id. at 443-44, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 960.
• 328 Id. at 445, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
327 Id. at 447, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 962.
528 Id. at 445-46, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
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Snow from the students in Donohue and Hoffman. 329
 The court noted
that in Hoffman, the teacher's daily observation of the plaintiff's
lack of progress justified the teacher's decision not to reevaluate
him.33° Thus, the court maintained that the decision not to retest-
the student in Hoffman was an error of judgment in the educational
process. In contrast, the New York Supreme Court concluded that
the teachers' recorded observations in Snow should have put them
on notice of the inaccuracy of the original I.Q. test and the need
for reevaluation. The Snow court held that the schools' conduct was
actionable medical, not educational, malpractice."' Thus, the New
York Supreme Court established that negligent diagnosis, treat-
ment, and education claims against educators can be sustained, if
the court characterizes them as medical malpractice.
Similarly, in 1986, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate
Division, in Savino v. Board of Education, considered a mother's claim
that a school's agents had conducted psychological tests on her son,
which revealed that he was suffering from severe psychological
problems, and that the school had failed to notify her. 332
 In holding
for the plaintiff, the Savino court maintained that because the claim
did not allege improper education or failure to assess a student's
intellectual capacity correctly, the claim was not educational. 333 The
court in Savino concluded that the school's diagnostic actions were
not educational in nature.534
 As a result, the Savino court established
that if a claim against a school for negligent evaluation does not
allege educational malpractice, the action may be permissible.
Although the New York courts have concluded that some stu-
dent claims against schools are actionable medical malpractice, they
have recharacterized other students' medical claims as educational,
and dismissed them. 335
 For example, in 1987, the New York Su-
" See id. at 449-50, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 963-64.
535 Id. at 450, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 964.
s" Id. at 445, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 961. In Torres v. Little Flower Children's Services, the New
York Court of Appeals distinguished Snow, stating that in Snow the students were referred
to as "patients," the plaintiff's records resembled hospital records rather than a school report,
and payment for treatment was made under a parent's medical plan. 64 N.Y.2d 119, 126
n.2, 474 N.E.2d 223, 226 n.2, 485 N.Y.S.2d 15, 18 n.2 (1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 864
(1985). The court further reasoned that a child's age upon entry, the nature of the institution
and the kind of care given marked the difference between educational and medical mal-
practice claims. Id.
532
 123 A.D.2d 314, 314-15, 506 N.Y.S.2d 210, 211 (App. Div. 1986).
533 Id. at 315, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
534 See id. Presumably, this case could have proceeded under a label of medical mal-
practice.
335 See, e.g., Simmer v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 133 A.D.2d 748, 749-50,
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preme Court, Appellate Division, in Sitomer v. Half Hollow Hills
Central School District, held that a junior high school student's claim
against a school physician alleging medical negligence and negligent
infliction of emotional distress was for educational malpractice, and
therefore, not permitted under New York law. 336 The plaintiff al-
leged that the school physician's determination that he was not
physiologically mature enough to try out for the high school tennis
team was negligent. 337 He further alleged that the school physician
had negligently failed to exercise reasonable judgment and follow
proper medical procedures in evaluating his level of physiological
maturity. Moreover, the plaintiff alleged that the school district's
actions in support of this determination were arbitrary, capricious
and unlawful. The court reasoned that the school physician had
based his determination on the results of a state educational de-
partment screening test. Thus, citing Hoffman and Torres, the Sitomer
court noted that to allow the cause of action would be to substitute
inappropriately the court's judgment for the judgment of profes-
sional educators. Consequently, the Sitomer court concluded that the
student's claim was educational malpractice, and thus, not cogniz-
able under New York law. 338
In sum, claims alleging that educational institutions or their
agents have negligently evaluated, placed, or instructed students
have met with some success in the courts when the courts have
accepted them under a label of medical malpractice." 9 Where, how-
ever, the courts have decided that educators' decision-making
formed the basis for the defendant's conduct, they have refused to
recognize the claims as non-actionable educational malpractice. 34°
520 N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (App. Div. 1987). Moreover, in DeRosa a. City of New York, the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, considered a student's claim for educational negligence
and malpractice, and medical malpractice against a public school for misclassification. 132
A.D.2d 592, 593-94, 517 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755-56 (App. Div. 1987). The plaintiff alleged that
her school misdiagnosed and misplaced her in a class for the mentally retarded when she
was merely deaf. Id. at 593, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 755. The court concluded that the claim was
educational malpractice, and thus, not actionable. Id. at 594, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 756.
336 See 133 A.D.2d at 749, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
557 Id.
9" Id. at 749-50, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 38.
33° See Savino v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. 1, 123 A.D.2d 314, 314-15, 506
N.Y.S.2d 210 (App. Div. 1986); Snow v. State, 98 A.D.2d 442, 447, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962
(App. Div. 1983), aff 'd, 64 N.Y.2d 753, 475 N.E.2d 454, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984).
340
 Sitomer v. Half Hollow Hills Cent. School Dist., 133 A.D.2d 748, 749-50, 520
N.Y.S.2d 37, 38 (App. Div. 1987); DeRosa v. City of New York, 132 A.D.2d 592, 593-94,
517 N.Y.S.2d 754, 755-56 (App. Div. 1987). Factors such as the child's age, the method of
record keeping, and the form of payment for services appear to have some effect on the
courts' determination of which malpractice label applies.
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IV. A REVIEW OF PUBLIC POLICY: REALITY DEMANDS A CHANGE
The judicial system currently embraces malpractice claims
brought against medical personnel, lawyers, and other skilled
professionals."' The theory of these claims is that professionals hold
themselves out to the public as possessing a higher level of knowl-
edge or skill than the ordinary person, and thus, they invite public
reliance on their special abilities. 342
 The law, therefore, recognizes
that professionals should demonstrate a minimum level of skill and
be held liable for injury resulting from behavior that falls below
that standard."'
A cause of action in professional malpractice requires that a
plaintiff prove that the professional owed him or her a duty of care,
that the professional breached a standard of care defining that duty,
and that such breach proximately caused an injury.'" The standard
of care, as the basis for a negligence action, is defined as the be-
havior usual and customary in the defendant's profession. 345
 With-
out a standard and duty of care no breach can occur and, conse-
quently, no tort liability results.
In 1976, a public school graduate was one of the first plaintiffs
to attempt to apply the theory of professional malpractice to edu-
cators whom he claimed had failed to educate him. 346 The plaintiff
in Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School District alleged that despite
his attendance at the defendant's school system for twelve years, he
was unable to read and write competently. 347
 This student claimed
that as a result of the school's failure to exercise the professional
skill of an ordinary and prudent educator; he had suffered recog-
nizable injury.
In denying the boy's claim, the California Court of Appeal
reasoned that it could only sanction the novel cause of action for
professional malpractice if public policy supported it. 348 Public pol-
icy, the Peter W. court maintained, was dictated by a host of practical,
fiscal, and philosophical issues. 349 Recognition of this new area of
'4 ' See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
542 See supra notes 35-46 and accompanying text.
'4' Id.
'4 ' See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
545 See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
548
	 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 819, 817-18, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 855-56 (Ct. App. 1976). See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Peter W. decision.
341 Peter W., at 818, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
3" Id. at 822, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
MS IS a t R92-23. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
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tort liability, the Peter W. court noted, required that the court first
discuss and balance each of the relevant public policy concerns for
or against recognition. After doing so, the Peter W. court concluded
that public policy warranted dismissal of the action.
A year later, the New York Supreme Court, in Donohue v.
Copiague Union Free School District,350 simplified and categorized most
of the public policy issues that the Peter W. court had identified. By
labeling these public policy issues as preventative, moral, economic,
or administrative considerations, the Donohue court provided a
framework for the subsequent debate over educational negligence.
Preventative public policy issues included the ease or difficulty of
establishing a standard of care for educators, proving causation,
and evaluating educational injury."' Moral public policy consider-
ations included society's view toward the student-teacher relation-
ship, the degree to which the courts should involve themselves in
that relationship, and education's social utility. Finally, economic
and administrative public policy considerations encompassed dis-
cussions of the school's ability to pay damages, and the possibility
of a flood of litigation.
Courts have validated this public policy framework as a basis
for judicial recognition of educational malpractice cases under a
variety of fact patterns,'" including whether the defendant is a
private or public school, or a social services agency.'" Whether the
plaintiff alleges misplacement, misdiagnosis, failure to educate, or
breach of contract, courts have reviewed the same public policy
considerations in order to reach their conclusions.'" Although no
court has discussed all of the considerations that the Peter W. and
Donohue courts raised, each court has selected one or more issues
as the basis for its holding.
A. Look Who's Calling Them Professionals
Underlying the theory of professional malpractice is the as-
sumption that the theory only applies to individuals who are profes-
sionals."' Prosser and Keeton have defined professionals as persons
ssu 64 A.D.2d 29, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979). See supra notes 73-92 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Donohue decision.
351 Id. at 33, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 877.
352 See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
"' See supra notes 174-92 and accompanying text.
354 See cases cited supra notes 98, 104 and accompanying text.
355 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
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who hold themselves out to society as having knowledge above and
beyond that of ordinary citizens. 356 At least one critic of educational
malpractice has argued that educators are not professionals, and
consequently, do not deserve a professional liability standard, even
if the courts can define one. 357
Nevertheless, as Judge Davidson argued in his Hunter dissent,
public educators, like lawyers and medical personnel, are certified,
specially trained individuals who hold themselves out as possessing
certain skills and knowledge that ordinary persons do not share. 558
Our society has increasingly come to rely on educators' skills and
the expertise that they impart to our nation's children. 359 Interest-
ingly, courts themselves in considering educational malpractice
claims have refused to substitute their judgment for what they call
that of professional educators.36° For example, in Palandino v. Adel-
phi University, the court deferred responsibility for determining pe-
dagogic methods to the state's professional educators. 361
Clearly, the courts have not accepted that laypersons possess
the same level of skill and knowledge as teachers and other edu-
cators. The debate over the judiciary's ability to establish a standard
of care for educators, and over the jury's ability to understand it,
indicates that the courts believe that non-educators cannot under-
stand education. 362 Some courts have even characterized education
as an occupation requiring so much special skill and ability, that
they have concluded that all educational policy decision-making
should be left to education officials. 363
In effect, courts have proclaimed that educators are such skilled
professionals that they do not qualify for a legal professional status
for purposes of malpractice claims. In other words, teachers, by
virtue of their special task, are immune from liability according to
the courts. One commentator even asserts that teachers are un-
356 See PROSSER 8c KEETON, Slipia note 35, at 164,186-87.
557 See supra notes 1 1 2-18 and accompanying text.
356 See Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582,588-89 (Md.
1982) (Davidson, J., concurring- in part and dissenting in part).
359 See supra notes 293-300 and accompanying text.
36° Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121,126-27,400 N.E.2d 317,
320,424 N.Y.S.2d 376,379 (1979).
361 See 89 A.D.2d 85,91-93,454 N.Y.S.2d 868,872-73 (App. Div. 1982). See supra notes
174-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Palandino decision.
362 See supra notes 112-32 and accompanying text.
965 See supra notes 261-74 and accompanying text.
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qualified to be labeled professionals,364 and yet, so skilled as to be
beyond judicial review. 365
In sum, the courts' own standard of care analysis is evidence
that education clearly falls within the parameters of professional
malpractice, and therefore, should be subject to judicial review.
Because educators possess a special expertise, and must obtain state
certification in the same manner as lawyers and medical personnel,
they should be subject to malpractice actions. 366 The courts' conclu-
sion that education is complex and dependent on educators' skill
should lead them to assume, not abdicate, responsibility for review-
ing professional misconduct in education.
B. Creation of a Professional Standard of Care: Nothing New
Courts that have refused to recognize educational malpractice
claims have articulated a recurring public policy theme that the
difficulties of proving the tort elements in the educational context
are so formidable as to warrant judicial nonrecognition of the cause
of action. Thus, opponents of educational malpractice claims focus
much of their attention on what they perceive as the judiciary's
inability to establish a standard of care for educators. 367 Education,
they argue, is so complex, subjective, and collaborative, as to make
the establishment of a standard of care impossible. 568 These oppo-
nents lead us to believe that teaching is so mysterious, so delicate,
and so random as to be devoid of generally accepted guidelines
upon which the courts could base a common-law duty of care. For
example, in Smith, the court concluded that judicial review of edu-
cational policies would result in an unacceptable, highly speculative
inquiry because of the subjective nature of educational methodol-
ogy. 369 Similarly, the Donohue court claimed that triers of fact would
be unable to decide which educational policies should have been
384 See Funston, supra note 2, at 774.
56' See id. at. 795.
'66 See Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 588-89 (Md.
1982) (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See supra notes 138-41 and
accompanying text.
367 See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 112-219 and accompanying text.
3" See Smith v. Alameda County Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941-43,
153 Cal. Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979). See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Smith decision.
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pursued or avoided. 3" Moreover, the Peter W. court concluded that
because education was unlike marketplace or transportation profes-
sions, it was not a candidate for malpractice recognition."'
Thus, some courts conclude that, unlike in other professions,
the educational community cannot establish for the court an ac-
cepted standard of conduct for educators. This conclusion is incon-
sistent with traditional notions of professional malpractice. Histor-
ically, courts have reviewed the conduct of lawyers, psychiatrists,
psychologists, brain surgeons, and even more recently the clergy,
in plaintiffs' claims for malpractice liability. 372 Could it be that the
interactive nature of therapy, the complexity of neurosurgery, or
the discretion of religious counseling are more easily understood
and definable than educational policies? Can it be that the courts
are more comfortable reviewing the implementation of His stan-
dards for behavior than those of the local school board?
Despite the complexities of educational policy, generating a
standard of care against which to measure educators' conduct is not
the insurmountable obstacle that some courts have concluded.'"
For instance, Judge Davidson, in his dissent in Hunter v. Board of
Education of Montgomery County, correctly argued that courts consis-
tently have recognized non-educational malpractice claims that have
involved a myriad of intangibles and unknown quantities. 374 He
further accurately concluded that courts can evaluate an educator's
methodology, like a physician's choice of treatment, against a profes-
sional standard that expert testimony establishes. 375 Moreover, ed-
ucational experts assert that empirical evidence on pedagogic meth-
odology exists, and that courts could use such evidence to establish
a professional standard of care for educators.'"
For example, the California Court of Appeal used expert tes-
timony in Riverside v. Loma Linda University to establish a standard
of care for medical teaching. 377 In Riverside, the court used expert
37° See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 35, 407 N.Y.S.2d
874, 879 (App. Div. 1978), aff 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
"' Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cat. App. 3d 814, 824, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 860 (Ct. App. 1976).
372 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
375 See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
"4 439 A.2d 582, 589 (Md. 1982) (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
373 Id. at 588-89 (Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
376 See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
377 See 118 Cal. App. 3d 300, 317-18, 173 Cal. Rptr. 371, 380 (Ct. App. 1981). See supra
notes 193-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Riverside decision.
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testimony to determine that a medical school had not trained a
county hospital's residents according to the standards of practice
for reasonable medical teaching institutions. 378
 Similarly, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, in Snow v. State, did not
hesitate to use professional testimony in determining that a school's
failure to reevaluate a student was an error of professional judg-
ment.379
 The Snow court easily deferred to the opinion of psychol-
ogists and medical personnel in concluding that the schools had
negligently evaluated the plaintiff. In light of these decisions, it is
not a stretch to imagine that courts could use expert witnesses in
determining what constitutes appropriate conduct for all educators.
Admittedly, the complexities of such evidence may be formidable,
but no more so than evidence of the correct procedures for con-
ducting open heart surgery, or for providing legal advice or psy-
chological counseling.
Alternatively, if a court is unable to determine a common-law
standard generated by expert testimony, it could rely on legislated
standards. 38° Admittedly, a majority of the courts that have consid-
ered educational malpractice claims based on violations of state law
have concluded that state educational constitutional provisions and
legislation do not create civil liability. 38 ' Often, these courts have
concluded that the injury that a plaintiff claims to have suffered in
an educational malpractice action is not the type of injury that the
legislation contemplates, and therefore, the legislation is not a basis
for tort liability.
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court, in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks
North Star Borough School District, concluded that the Alaskan excep-
tional education act did not expressly or impliedly authorize a child's
claim for damages resulting from its violation. 382 Furthermore, in
Pierce v. Board of Education of Chicago, the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the Illinois state constitution's educational provision was
not self-executing, but rather was only a statement of general phi-
losophy. 383
 Therefore, the Pierce and D.S.W. courts held that state
378
 Riverside, 118 Cal. App. 3d at 317-18, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
379
 See 98 A.D.2d 442, 447-48, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 962-63 (App. Div. 1983), aff'd, 64
N.Y.2d 753, 475 N.E.2d 454, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984). See supra notes 322-31 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of the Snow decision.
3" See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
3" 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 1981). See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the D.S.W. decision.
333
 69 Ill. 2d 89, 92-93, 370 N.E.2d 535, 556 (1977). See supra notes 162-64 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Pierce decision.
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educators owed no mandatory duty of care to students, and no
negligence cause of action against a school was recognizable.
Although regrettable, these conclusions are not a death toll for
all claims of educational negligence. Even if legislative standards in
and of themselves do not create a mandatory legal duty of care for
educators, these standards are expressions of accepted principles
that courts could use as guidelines for evaluating educators' conduct
in their respective states. Historically, courts have willingly used state
educational standards to evaluate the success or failure of state
school funding. 384 If courts use education legislation when deter-
mining liability for fiscal injustice, they should not balk at using the
same standards where a child has been injured.
Admittedly, a theoretical standard of care does not always equal
a legal duty of care."' But if the concern underlying, the public
policy analysis of courts like Peter W., Donohue, and Smith is the
complex and ill-defined nature of educational methodology, legis-
lated standards conceivably could be of some guidance. Because
"4 In 1979, in Pauley v. Kelly, the West Virginia Supreme Court considered a class action
claim that a system of financing public schools denied students a thorough and efficient
education in violation of West Virginia's constitution, and refused to dismiss the plaintiffs'
claim for relief. 255 S.E.2d 859, 861, 863, 889 (W. Va. 1979). The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant had not conformed with the West Virginia state constitution's education article
which mandated that the legislature provide for a thorough and efficient system of schools.
Id. at 861. The Kelly court reasoned that judicial review of the state's implementation of
educational policy was appropriate. See id. at 863, 874. It further reasoned that although the
legislature had discretionary judgment over educational policies, education was a fundamen-
tal right and the court had a right to monitor implementation of such policies. See id. at 878.
In Kelly, the court reasoned that the court had to give content to the state constitutional
phrase "thorough and efficient." See id. at 874-77. The court also noted that despite a general
consensus that the judiciary should not undertake a review of educational legislation, courts
had not hesitated to review legislative performance. Id. at 869-70. Consequently, the Kelly
court concluded that a state-funded thorough and efficient education contained elements of
literacy, simple mathematical ability, a knowledge of government, self-knowledge and knowl-
edge of the environment, work training or advanced academic training, recreational pursuits,
an understanding of the creative arts, and social ethics. Id. at 877. Thus, in remanding the
case, the court noted that expert testimony and legislatively established standards could be
used to set standards for the education system.
Similarly, in 1984, in Pauley v. Bailey, the West Virginia Supreme Court considered a
class action claim that a school had failed to enforce the court-approved "Master Plan for
Public Education" which set forth standards defining the educational role of the various state
and local agencies and specific elements of educational programs, enumerated considerations
for educational facilities and proposed changes in the educational financing system in vio-
lation of the state constitution. 324 S.E.2d 128, 129, 132-33 (W. Va. 1984). The court held
that state educational officials had a duty to implement and enforce the Master Plan's policies
and standards. Id. at 135. Thus, the Bailey court remanded the case for further court
monitoring of the Master Plan's implementation. Id. at 137.
"5 See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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such legislation often sets out minimum standards for educational
achievement,386 it could serve as a measure of educator conduct. If
the courts can defer to the legislative branch to determine educa-
tional policy, 387 then they can also use legislative enactments to
award civil damages to children who have been negligently taught.
In sum, courts' conclusions that educational malpractice claims
make it impossible for them to establish a standard of care for
educators because of education's complexity do not acknowledge
current legal reality. Courts long ago assumed the responsibility of
establishing standards of conduct for non-educator professionals
with the help of expert witnesses, and they can do so for educators.
Alternatively, although statutory guidelines regarding education
cannot create tort liability per se, courts could use them as a frame-
work in which to evaluate educators' conduct for educational mal-
practice claims. After the courts have adopted one of these stan-
dards of care, they would be free to determine if the other elements
of an educational malpractice claim, breach, causation, and injury,
were present.
C. Causation and Injury: Inconsistencies in the Law
The courts' review of the elements of public policy have in-
cluded cursory discussions of the difficulties inherent in proving
causation and assessing a plaintiff's injury in educational malprac-
tice claims. 388
 They conclude that proof of causation is impracti-
cal,389 and that the value of educational injury is immeasurable. 39°
For example, the Peter W. court decided that learning involved the
interaction of multiple factors, many of which were beyond the
control of the educational process."' Therefore, the Peter W. court
concluded that proving educational negligence causation was im-
possible. 392 Similarly, because the D.S. W. court concluded that it was
impossible to determine a child's academic success absent his teach-
ers' negligent behavior, it reasoned that it was beyond the court's
888 See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text.
387 See supra notes 119-32, 261-74 and accompanying text.
888 See supra notes 220-60 and accompanying text.
989 See supra notes 221-29 and accompanying text.
m See supra notes 240-46 and accompanying text.
"' See Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal App. 3d 823, 824-25, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 861 (Ct. App. 1976). See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Peter W. decision.
397 See 60 Cal. App. 3d at 825, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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ability to prove that the defendant's conduct had caused the plain-
tiffs' injuries. 393
Admittedly, as the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois, asserted in Ross v. Creighton University, edu-
cation is a one-on-one, interactive endeavor that is administered on
a large scale, involving a variety of internal and external factors. 394
Although it is often difficult to determine why one student cannot
master simple algebra and another excels in calculus, these condi-
tions are no different from those that exist in the activities of other
highly skilled professionals. 395 As the New York Court of Appeals
stated in Donohue, it assumes too much to conclude that causation
in educational negligence can never be proven. 396
Analogously, it is not clear in medical malpractice actions why
one patient responded to medical treatment and another remained
comatose. The same logic that motivates courts to review medical
malpractice allegations when a patient is left without motor skills
after a twelve hour operation should prompt a judicial review of
educational malpractice allegations when a child is left without basic
reading or arithmetic skills after twelve years of education. Like any
other professionals, educators take students as they find them, and
courts should therefore hold an educator liable if the educator's
actions make a child worse off than he or she would have been
absent the educator's negligent conduct. 397
In support of the conclusion that causation should not be a
major obstacle to judicial recognition are the New York Supreme
Court's decisions in Snow v. State and Savino v. Board of Education.398
In Snow, under the well-worn label of medical malpractice, the court
had no difficulty concluding that a school's negligent reevaluation
and placement of a student was the cause of the student's injuries,
and thus, that the school's conduct was subject to judicial review. 399
393 D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 1981).
See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the D.S.W. decision.
394 See 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1328-29 (N.D. 111. 1990). See supra notes 225, 308-10 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Ross decision.
69.5
	
Elson, supra note 49, at 670. See supra notes 133-44 and accompanying text for
a discussion of courts' ability to establish a common-law standard of care for educators.
"6 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist.,•47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979).
397 See Jerry, supra note 232, at 206-07.
"8 See supra notes 322-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Snow and
Savino decisions.
399 See Snow v. State, 98 A.D.2d 442, 449, 469 N.Y.S.2d 959, 963 (App. Div. 1983), aff 'd,
64 N.Y.2d 753, 475 N.E.2d 454, 485 N.Y.S.2d 987 (1984).
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Likewise, in Savino, the court concluded that a claim alleging that a
school negligently administered a psychological test to a student was
not educational malpractice, and therefore, the court refused to
dismiss the action. 40° Presumably, the plaintiff in Savino would have
been more successful if he had brought the claim under a medical
malpractice label. These two cases raise the same issues of multiple
factors, interactive instruction, and individual motivation that critics
of educational malpractice actions have identified. Thus, the hold-
ings in Snow and Savino clearly support the New York Supreme
Court's declaration in Donohue that one can prove causation in
educational malpractice.
Finally, as the Montana Supreme Court concluded in B.M. v.
State, whether educational malpractice has occurred is a question
for the trier of fact. 40 ' One commentator suggests a child suing for
educational malpractice who can assert the elements of a cause of
action in tort should have the same opportunity as the children in
Savino and Snow to present such evidence. 402 Whether the presence
of external or internal factors will defeat an educational malpractice
claim is a question of fact, and thus, is a decision for the judge or
jury. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, before it
was reversed on appeal, correctly stated in Hoffman, that dismissal
of educational malpractice claims is an intrusion on the jury's role
as trier of fact. 403 Hence, difficulty of proving causation is no reason
to deny injured plaintiffs remedies they deserve.
In addition to reasoning that causation is impossible to prove
in educational malpractice claims, courts have drawn the disturbing
conclusion that educational injury is neither certain nor measurable.
The Donohue court, for example, boldly stated that because every
child is born ignorant, the failure of educational achievement is not
a tortious injury, 404 Not only have courts questioned the existence
of injury, but in Hunter, the Maryland Court of Appeals went so far
as to conclude that even if injury occurred, it could never be mea-
46° Savino v. Board of Educ. of School Dist. No. I, 123 A.D.2d 314, 315, 506 N.Y.S.2d
210, 211 (App. Div. 1986).
401
 B.M. v. State, 200 Mont. 58, 60, 649 P.2d 425, 426 (1982). See supra notes 148-58
and accompanying text for a discussion of the B.M, decision.
402 See Ratner, supra note 142, at 857. See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text
for a brief summary of this commentator's arguments.
4" Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 64 A.D.2d 369, 387, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 111
(App. Div. 1978), rev'd,• 49 N.Y.2d 121, 900 N.E.2d 317, 424 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1979).
404 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 37, 407 N.Y.S.2d 874,
880 (App. Div. 1978), aff 'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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sured.905 One commentator has even asserted that because the loss
of an education is really only the loss of an expectancy interest
measured in terms of self-esteem or earning potential, it is specu-
lative, uncertain, and does not warrant damages."6
It is inconceivable, however, that in a country largely dependent
on sophisticated technology -and services, courts can hold that the
loss of an education is not a measurable injury. In 1986, the United
States Census Bureau, Education Department, reported that thir-
teen percent of all U.S. adults were illiterate in the English language,
unable to read at a fifth grade level."' One commentator estimates
that four out of five young adults cannot summarize the main point
of a newspaper article, read a bus schedule, or figure their change
from a restaurant bill.'" The lack of basic,education skills leads to
low-wage, minimal skill jobs and an overall decline in the nation's
economy.409 Thus, the courts should acknowledge that the lack of
an adequate education is a real and substantive injury.
Although courts may have difficulty in assessing the injuries
that educational malpractice plaintiffs may suffer as a result of a
loss of self-esteem, job opportunity or earning potential, they should
not abdicate their responsibility to remedy wrongs simply because
of inconvenience. 4 ' 0 Judge Davidson correctly noted in his Hunter
dissent that courts have long recognized mental or emotional dis-
tress injuries.4 " In divorce settlements, for example, courts have
considered education as a marital asset that the judiciary must al-
locate.412 Courts have valued skills or education when they have
affected future earning ability.413 Thus, difficulty in assessing the
405 See Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982),
modifying 47 Md. App. 709, 425 A.2d 681 (Ct. Spec. App. 1981). See supra notes 135-44 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Hunter decision.
4D6 See Funston, supra note 2, at 784. See supra notes 328-33 and accompanying text.
41" A. LEAN & W. EATON, EDUCATION OR CATASTROPHE 27 (1990). See generally M. CETRON,
SCHOOLS OF THE FUTURE: How AMERICAN BUSINESS AND EDUCATION CAN COOPERATE TO SAVE
OUR SCHOOLS 7 (1985) (stating that sixty percent of the United States' adult population
cannot read well enough to go through their everyday lives without difficulty).
401 D. KEARNS & D. DOYLE, supra note 1, at 1.
4°9 Youths Lacking Special Skills Find Jobs Leading Nowhere, N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1990, at
I, col. 3.
41° See supra notes 230-36, 253-57 and accompanying text for discussions of the prov-
ability of causation and injury in educational malpractice claims.
4" Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 589 (Md. 1982)
(Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
4' See Jerry, supra note 232, at 203 n.71; see also Krauskopf, supra note 256, at 388-89;
Note, supra note 254, at 756-59.
4I See Jerry, supra note 232, at 203 n.71.
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damages that may result from educational malpractice is unpersu-
asive in refusing to recognize the tort of educational malpractice. 414
In conclusion, it is not impossible to prove in the twentieth
century that an illiterate teenager has suffered a measurable injury
that his educators may have caused. 415 Difficulties in proof of cau-
sation and injury are not unique to educational actions; they are
inherent in all professional malpractice claims. In fact, the same
courts that have refused to recognize educational malpractice claims
because of such practical difficulties have welcomed similar actions
that were brought under an alternative label. Clearly, arguments
against recognition of educational malpractice claims that cite the
difficulties of causation and injury do not acknowledge the advance-
ments that both pedagogy and modern complex litigation have
made in the last decade.
D. Judicial Review Need Not Be Unsophisticated or Intrusive
Under the heading of moral public policy considerations, the
courts have devoted much time to discussing the desirability of
judicial involvement in state educational policies. 416 That is, the
courts in Donohue,417 Smith,418 and some commentators 419 have sug-
gested that unsophisticated jurors and intrusive court officials nec-
essarily plague judicial review of educational malpractice claims.
Repeatedly, courts have suggested that jurors are not able to deci-
pher the subtleties of educational methodology. In addition, courts
have reasoned that they are not legislators and do not want to
involve themselves in making educational policies. 420
For example, in Donohue, the New York Supreme Court con-
cluded that the judicial system should not test the efficacy of edu-
cational programs and pedagogical methods. 42 ' The New York
Court of Appeals in Hoffman also expressed its reluctance to sub-
414 Id. at 203.
415 See Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 443, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1354, 418 N.Y.S.2d 375, 377 (1979). See supra notes 240-57 and accompanying text
for a discussion of whether educational injury can be measured.
41° See supra notes 260-302 and accompanying text.
427 See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 35-37, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 879-80.
415 See Smith v. Alameda Social Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 936-37, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 712, 715-16 (Ct. App. 1979).
412 See supra notes 119-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' and jurors'
perceived unsophistication.
42° See supra notes 361-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' unwilling-
ness to sanction judicial review of educational malpractice claims.
421 See Donohue, 47 N.Y.2d at 444-45, 391 N.E,2d at 1353-54, 418 N.Y.S.2d at 378.
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stitute its judgment for that of professional educators. 422 Similarly,
the Maryland Court of Appeals in Hunter concluded that it was in
no position to oversee the formulation of educational policies or
schools' day-to-day operations. 423 Review of educational policies, the
Hunter court concluded, was the exclusive territory of state legisla-
tures and local school officials. 424 Thus, courts have indicated that
the judicial system is unwilling and unprepared to evaluate and
judge the subtle decision-making of our nation's educators.
This conclusion seems suspect in light of the complex issues
that confront juries in other malpractice claims. Perhaps the Torres
court feared that the jury would not have understood that a school
agent was negligent in placing a Spanish-speaking child in a class
for the mentally retarded because he failed an I.Q. test written in
English.425 Or, maybe the court in Hoffman reasoned that state
school officials had exercised their discretion appropriately when
they placed a child with normal intelligence into a class for the
mentally retarded for eleven - years without retesting him.426 Cer-
tainly, the Peter W. court believed that to review an illiterate, math-
deficient public school graduate's claim of negligence would require
the court to second-guess legislative standards. 427
And yet, it is difficult to conclude that the fact patterns in Torres,
Hoffman, or Peter W. were more complex or confusing than the
evaluation and instructional treatment that characterized the defen-
dants' conduct in Snow or Savino. In Snow, the court did not hesitate
to substitute its judgment for the judgment of professionals under
the label of medical malpractice.428 The Torres court suggested that
the defendant school's failure to have the look and feel of a medical
facility like the Snow defendant's institution was a determining fac-
tor in the court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's claim. Since when
does the look and feel of a negligent facility determine whether an
injured child receives legal compensation?
422 See Hoffman v. Board of Educ. of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 121,125-26,400 N.E.2d
317,319-20,424 N.Y.S.2d 376,378-79 (1979).
425 Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582,585 (Md. 1982).
424 Id. at 585-86.
425 See supra notes 184-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Torres decision.
426 See supra notes 264-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Hoffman
decision.
427 See supra notes 52-72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Peter W. decision.
428 See supra notes 322-34 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Snow and
Savino decisions.
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Whatever the validity of these decisions, claims involving mis-
placement, misdiagnosis, or negligent teaching do not necessitate
that courts and layjurors determine pedagogic methodology or sec-
ond-guess legislatures. Educational malpractice claims merely ask
that the court enforce accepted professional or legislative education
standards. 429 Once courts acknowledge that a common-law or sta-
tutory standard of care for educators exists, the courts' argument
that they are encroaching on the legislature's power or local edu-
cation officials' expertise loses its force. In such a world, the judg-
ment of accepted educational methodology or provisions of state
legislation will be substituted for the judgment of negligent educa-
tors. Thus, the courts' only responsibility would be to enforce al-
ready existing standards, and not to set such standards.
For instance, if the courts were to adopt a common-law stan-
dard of care, the use of expert testimony would greatly limit the
extent to which courts would be substituting their own judgments
for those of professional educators. In these instances, a jury would
be asked simply to compare the defendant's activity to that of the
usual and customary conduct of educators. In such cases, the court
would be substituting a prudent educator's judgment for the judg-
ment of the alleged negligent educator. Courts have long used this
approach in medical malpractice claims, and there is no reason why
they cannot use it in educational malpractice claims as well.
Alternatively, courts could use legislative enactments as a tool
for evaluating educators' conduct as courts have done in the past.
For example, in B.M. v. State, the Montana Supreme Court held
that a school's failure to test and place a special needs student in
accordance with the state constitution may subject the school to
liability. 43° In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Haswell noted
that the constitution created a mandatory statutory duty of care for
state educators which the court could enforce.43 ' Likewise, in Do-
nohue, Judge Suozzi in dissent pointed to a New York regulation
requiring that state diploma recipients satisfactorily complete an
approved four year course of study. 432 Judge Suozzi argued that
429 See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' ability to
derive a statutory standard of care for educators.
• 4" 200 Mont. 58, 63-64, 649 P.2d 425, 427-28 (1982). See supra notes 148-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the B.M. decision.
4" See B.M., 200 Mont. at 65, 649 P.2d at 428 (Haswell, J., concurring).
4s4
	 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 A.D,2d 29, 42-44, 407 N.Y.S.2d
874, 883-84 (App. Div. 1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 440, 391 N.E.2d 1352,
418 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1979).
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Donohue's failing grades were clearly in violation of legislative stan-
dards, and thus, the school's decision to graduate him was suspect
and subject to judicial review. 433
Judges and commentators have suggested that where legislated
accountability standards for educators exist, the courts need only
enforce, not evaluate, such standards. 434 Thus, in adopting a stan-
dard of care for educators set forth in legislation, courts would
merely be substituting the judgment of state officials and educa-
tional experts for the alleged negligent educator's judgment. As
Judge Davidson suggests in his Hunter dissent, there is no reason
to believe that the legislature's delegation of responsibility to edu-
cation officials was intended to provide those officials with immunity
for their negligent conduct in failing to uphold the state's own
educational standards. 435
In sum, judicial intervention on behalf of plaintiffs whom ed-
ucators have injured need not be heavy-handed and unguided. The
spectre of judicial encroachment that the courts have evoked in
deciding educational malpractice claims is not the inevitable out-
come of recognizing such claims. By adopting a standard of care
for educators in common-law or statutory decree, the courts will
remove any possibility of unwarranted judicial interference in state
educational policies. Armed with expert testimony or legislative
language describing accepted conduct, a court can evaluate a de-
fendant educator's alleged negligent behavior without stepping on
the turf of state education officials.
E. Taking Comfort in Contracts: Leaving out the Disadvantaged
Ironically, some courts that have considered educational neg-
ligence breach of contract claims against private institutions have
indicated that contract terms are more justiciable as a standard of
care for educators than statutory provisions or accepted profes-
sional conduct. 436
 Although courts have been generally reluctant to
accept educational malpractice causes of action, they appear more
willing to entertain the notion of educational negligence when it is
433 See Donohue, 64 A.D.2d at 42,407 N.Y.S.2d at 883 (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
4s4
 See supra notes 148-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' ability to
derive a statutory standard of care for educators.
455 See Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582,590 (Md. 1982)
(Davidson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
456
 See supra notes 193-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of courts' willingness




couched in the language of a consensual agreement between private
parties. For example, the California Court of Appeal, in Riverside
v. Loma Linda University, considered an indemnification action
against a medical school for the value of a settlement of a medical
malpractice action against the county's hospita1. 4" In Riverside, the
county claimed that the school was negligent in discharging its
contractual obligations to provide training for the hospital's resi-
dents.438 Holding in favor of the county, the Riverside court stated
that the contract created a special relationship between the county
and the medical school, and made objective standards available for
determining an educator's standard of care. 439 Thus, after reviewing
the agreement and expert testimony, the Riverside court determined
that the medical school had not trained the hospital residents
properly, and that the school could be found liable for negligence. 44°
Furthermore, at least one court has concluded that where a
private school promises it will detect and treat its students' special
learning disorders, a contract relationship exists which the court
can enforce."' In Village Community School v. Adler, the court rea-
soned that where a school made special promises to a student, the
contract terms between the student and the school were not discre-
tionary. The Adler court maintained that the defendant's conduct
was reviewable for educational negligence based on breach of con-
tract.. Thus, the Adler and Riverside opiniOnS indicate that courts are
more likely to favor a student alleging negligent instruction in the
form of a breach of a specific, private contract provision than a
public school student alleging violation of a legislated or community
standard of conduct.
It is clear, therefore, that some courts confronted with contract
claims for educational malpractice have focused on the tangible
nature of contracts to escape from the complexities of tort claims.
An extreme example of this is the Ohio Court of Appeals' decision
in Malone v. Academy of Court Reporting. 442 The Malone court went so
far as to state that if a plaintiff's claim for breach of contract against
"7 118 Cal. App. 3d 300, 307, 173 Cal. Rptr. 371, 373 (Ct. App. 1981). See supra notes
193-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Riverside decision.
4" Riverside, 118 Cal. App, at 316, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 379.
4" Id. at 317 n.7, 173'Cal. Rptr. at 379-80 n.7.
44° See id. at 318-19, 173 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
441 See Village Community School v. Adler, 124 Misc. 2d 817, 819, 478 N.Y.S.2d 546,
548 (Civ. Ct. 1984). See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Adler decision.
"2 No. 90AP-264, 90AP-430 (Ohio App. Dec. 31, 1990) (LEXIS, States library, Omni
file). See supra notes 203-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Malone decision.
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a private educational institution does not mention the words edu-
cational negligence or malpractice, the claim is purely contractual,
and the court will recognize it. This reasoning makes little sense if
underlying the breach of contract is a failure to provide adequate
educational services. Although one can argue that the existence of
the contract alleviates a court's concern over a legal standard of
care, it does not remove the difficulty of proving causation or injury.
It also does not counter the public policy concerns over judicial
review of pedagogic practices, and the administrative difficulties
that courts have thrown up as barriers to recognition of educational
malpractice actions. 443 Thus, courts' relative eagerness to accept
contract claims against private institutions is evidence that they have
engaged in an inconsistent semantic game in order to avoid recog-
nizing a valid malpractice claim against educators.
Again, this judicial avoidance does not mean that educational
malpractice claims are doomed. The courts' progress toward favor-
ing recognition of claims in the form of contract breaches supports
the conclusion that courts can establish a standard of care for ed-
ucators and recognize a tort claim. If courts have recognized that
breach of a specific contract provision can result in educational
liability, then courts can review specific educational policies for neg-
ligence. In other words, if courts can enforce contractual specifics
without evaluating discretionary judgment, then they could con-
ceivably enforce legislative specifics without second-guessing legis-
latures.
Unfortunately, the immediate result of the courts' evolution is
not likely to be so forward thinking. With a contract in the left hand
defining the behavioral obligations of a contracted educator, and
the state constitution in the right hand defining minimum state
education standards, courts appear to find more authority in the
left hand. As a result, courts will probably continue the semantic
shell game by providing a remedy for those children fortunate
enough to have the resources to attend private educational institu-
tions, but not for public school students. A greater number of the
economically and socially disadvantaged children in this country are
likely to attend public schools than will attend private institutions.
Consequently, advantaged children whom private educators have
injured will receive damages, while inner-city children will remain
4" See supra notes 220-29, 240-46, 351-74 and accompanying text for discussions of
the procedural and administrative barriers that courts have cited as reasons for denying
educational malpractice claims.
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uncompensated. Unless the common law changes, these inequities
will only worsen.
Courts have rationalized their refusal to change the common
law and recognize educational malpractice by stating that current
law does not disadvantage students. 444 These courts have asserted
that no civil action for educational negligence exists because more
desirable out-of-court methods for settling such disputes are avail-
able. For example, the Hunter court, in holding that a student had
no cause of action against his school, reasoned that administrative
procedures existed that could correct erroneous educational prac-
tices and obviate the need for monetary damages. 445
 Monetary dam-
ages, the Alaska Supreme Court concluded in D.S.W., were a sin-
gularly inappropriate remedy for educational injuries when
tutorials were available. 446
 Thus, courts have concluded that rec-
ognizing a tort claim for malpractice would not add to the remedies
currently available to plaintiffs who believe that educators have
injured them.
Unfortunately, administrative procedures simply do not ad-
dress the injuries that children have suffered as the result of edu-
cational malpractice. 447
 Often, plaintiffs bringing claims for educa-
tional malpractice have already graduated or are close to graduating
from the school system. For instance, in his Doe dissent, Judge
Eldridge correctly argued that students claiming educational mal-
practice are often in need of psychological treatment and special
education, neither of which is available through administrative pro-
cedures.448
 Consequently, although administrative review and in-
junctive relief may improve conditions for those students who still
attend school, or who are at the start of their academic careers,
these procedures offer little relief to an older plaintiff who no
longer attends the defendant's school.
Admittedly, the United States judicial system is a strong ally of
contractual relationships such as those between a private school and
its students, but this favoritism should not work against public
school students who have suffered injuries. Moreover, such a strict
4" See supra notes 275-81 and accompanying text for descriptions of alternative rem-
edies to civil action for plaintiffs alleging educational malpractice.
4" Hunter v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 439 A.2d 582, 586 (Md, 1982).
"6
 D.S.W. v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough School Dist., 628 P.2d 554, 556 (Alaska 1981).
" 7 See supra notes 282-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of why alternative
remedies do not adequately compensate educational malpractice victims.
"a See Doe v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814, 823 (Md. 1982)
(Eldridge, J., dissenting).
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reliance on contract law in educational negligence claims harms
plaintiffs who do not have specific enough contracts with their
schools. In these circumstances, a civil action's damages award is
likely to be the plaintiff's only opportunity to gain the educational
or emotional support he or she requires.
In sum, in the absence of judicial recognition of a civil cause
of action in educational malpractice, a public school student who
has been emotionally or mentally damaged as the result of the
professional educator's negligent behavior is without recourse. Con-
versely, if the student is enrolled at a private institution and is a
party to a specific contract for services, the courts may consider a
claim for breach of contract. This conclusion is unacceptable be-
cause it discriminates between private and public school students.
If the fundamental justification for nonrecognition of educational
malpractice is education's unique nature and societal role, the fact
that one plaintiff pays for his or her education while another relies
on state-run facilities should be irrelevant. Consequently, these in-
equities in the development of educational malpractice law suggest
that the courts' analyses have been inconsistent and discriminatory,
and therefore, need revision.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts' justification for their refusal to recognize educa-
tional malpractice claims is fundamentally flawed. First, it does not
give equal weight to all of the relevant public policy considerations
and favors administrative and judicial worries over more important
societal concerns. Second, it has unjustifiably assumed that modern
pedagogic methods are unlike other professional practices, and
thus, defy judicial review. Third, courts have preemptively denied
deserving malpractice victims, and thereby, usurped the power tra-
ditionally left to the jury or trial judge. Finally, in applying their
questionable, and often inconsistent, public policy analyses, courts
have treated plaintiffs discriminatorily.
Although courts have extensively discussed the negative impact
of recognizing educational malpractice claims on the states' judicial
and school systems, they have spent little time evaluating its poten-
tial beneficial impact on the nation's children. There is a dearth of
judicial analysis concerning education's role in our society, the im-
portance of the student-teacher relationship and the gravity of the
rising level of illiteracy in this country. In order for the Donohue
public policy framework to have any validity to the review of edu-
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cational malpractice claims, it must include a balancing of all of the
issues, not just those that courts find most attractive.
Moreover, education is not so unique or complex that courts
can justify the barring of valid claims against educators for their
misconduct. In view of courts' recognition of educators as profes-
sionals, courts can reasonably hold them to a professional standard
of care. In order to avoid second-guessing educators and school
officials, the trier of fact can use existing legislated educational
enactments and expert testimony to establish a standard of conduct.
Some courts have concluded that they cannot understand ed-
ucation because it is too complex. As a result, they have preemp-
tively removed from judicial review those questions of fact tradi-
tionally left to juries. The refusal to recognize educational
malpractice claims has meant that deserving victims have been de-
nied relief. This outcome is inconsistent with the fact that courts
have long reviewed medical malpractice claims that require evalu-
ation of complex issues and discretionary conduct. The courts' de-
cisions to refuse to recognize educational malpractice claims entirely
is a far more serious example of oppressive judicial interference
than any that could arise during claimants' trials.
Lastly, courts have inconsistently applied their educational mal-
practice analyses, often distinguishing unconvincingly between
medical and educational negligence claims. Thus, similar claims
against educational institutions have resulted in opposite outcomes
because of the label they bore. Courts have also demonstrated a
marked preference for educational negligence claims based on con-
tracts over nearly identical tort claims. As a result, private school
students win damages while public school students do not. When
forms of professional malpractice become so blurred and confused
that not even the courts agree as to the dividing line, it is time to
reevaluate these analyses.
In sum, courts that have decided educational malpractice claims
have relied on incomplete and biased public policy analyses gener-
ated in the late 1970s. They have not acknowledged the current
realities of the educational and legal professions. With the growing
sophistication of educators, the possibility of serious injury resulting
from a lack of education, and the vulnerability of children, the time
is ripe for recognition of educational malpractice.
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